One State, Multiple Identities: Reimagining Political Accommodation and Durable Peace in Manipur

Assessment by Brigadier Niladri Shankar Mukherjee, Sena Medal, Vishisth Seva Medal (Retd), Executive Director, CENERS-K

This article sets out the Manipur Compact — a ten-pillar framework for security, autonomy, reconciliation and a lasting political settlement. Prepared for the Calcutta Journal of Global Affairs.

ABSTRACT

The conflict in Manipur, which escalated into large-scale ethnic violence in May 2023, constitutes one of the most serious challenges to internal security, federal governance and social cohesion in contemporary India. While the immediate confrontation has principally involved Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities, the crisis cannot adequately be understood as a simple bilateral ethnic conflict. It is rooted in a longer history of differentiated hill-valley governance, competing conceptions of territoriality, anxieties concerning land and demographic change, ethnic mobilisation, contested political authority and uneven confidence in state institutions. The conflict also affects and intersects with the political interests of Naga communities, the instability of the India-Myanmar borderlands and the wider strategic environment of India’s Northeast.

This article argues that neither a purely security-centric approach, restoration of the pre-2023 political status quo, nor unilateral acceptance of competing ethnic political demands is likely to produce a durable settlement. Sustainable peace requires an institutional arrangement in which no major community believes that its physical security, cultural identity, land rights or political future depends upon the defeat, displacement or permanent subordination of another community.

The article proposes a framework described as the Manipur Compact. Its central objective is to reconcile the territorial integrity of Manipur with meaningful institutional diversity and political accommodation. The Compact rests on six interdependent principles: territorial integrity; meaningful and constitutionally protected autonomy; impartial security; protection of land and customary institutions; justice and rehabilitation; and inclusive multi-community political dialogue.

The proposed framework does not seek to erase competing historical narratives. Instead, it seeks to create institutions capable of managing those differences without violence. It recommends enhanced and credible autonomy for hill communities without territorial partition; institutional reassurance concerning Meitei identity and territorial integrity; meaningful participation by Naga and other stakeholders; restoration of impartial state authority; universal and verifiable disarmament; phased rehabilitation of displaced populations; and permanent mechanisms for dialogue and conflict prevention.

The article concludes that Manipur’s future depends not upon the disappearance of ethnic difference but upon the creation of a political order in which difference does not produce insecurity. A settlement will endure only when the principal communities can regard compromise not as defeat but as a safer and more dignified alternative to perpetual confrontation.

Keywords: Manipur; Meitei; Kuki-Zo; Naga; ethnic conflict; autonomy; territoriality; federalism; reconciliation; internal security; Northeast India.

I. Introduction: Beyond Conflict Management

The conflict in Manipur presents India with a challenge that extends far beyond conventional questions of law and order. It raises fundamental questions concerning ethnicity and political authority, territorial integrity and autonomy, land and identity, constitutional federalism, differentiated governance and the capacity of state institutions to retain legitimacy during communal and ethnic violence.

The large-scale violence that began in May 2023 produced a profound rupture in Manipur’s social and political landscape. The Government of India subsequently constituted a Commission of Inquiry to examine the causes and spread of the violence and possible lapses by responsible authorities.¹ The conflict produced deaths, destruction, displacement and deep social separation. Yet the violence of 2023 should not be interpreted as an entirely new phenomenon. It represented the violent eruption of tensions that had accumulated over decades.

Manipur’s political problem is frequently described as a conflict between Meiteis and Kuki-Zo communities. This description identifies the principal axis of the recent violence but is insufficient as a framework for designing a durable settlement. Manipur is a multi-ethnic political space. Meiteis, Naga tribes, Kuki-Zo communities and other groups possess distinct histories, political experiences, social institutions and perceptions of insecurity.

A settlement constructed exclusively around two communities may therefore create a new set of exclusions.

The central question is consequently not merely: How can violence be stopped?

The more difficult question is: What political and institutional arrangements can enable the communities of Manipur to believe that their security and dignity do not depend upon defeating another community?

This article argues that a durable settlement must move beyond a winner-takes-all conception of political conflict. Neither of the following is likely to provide a sustainable solution: (1) the complete restoration of the political and institutional status quo that existed before May 2023; or (2) the unilateral fulfilment of maximalist ethnic demands that fundamentally alter the political status of other communities without their consent.

The alternative proposed here is a negotiated institutional framework described as the Manipur Compact. The Compact rests upon a central proposition: Manipur can remain politically united without requiring all its communities to accept identical institutional arrangements.

The article therefore advances four core principles:

• Unity without uniformity
• Autonomy without partition
• Security without ethnic domination
• Reconciliation without impunity

These principles are not intended as slogans. They represent an attempt to reconcile competing political requirements.

The Meitei population requires credible assurance concerning territorial integrity and cultural identity.

Kuki-Zo communities require credible guarantees concerning physical security, land, political voice and meaningful autonomy.

Naga communities require assurance that their interests and institutions will not be sacrificed in a bilateral political settlement.

The Government of India requires restoration of legitimate state authority, internal stability and effective management of the strategically sensitive border environment.

A settlement will endure only when these requirements are treated as interconnected rather than mutually exclusive.

II. Historical Roots of the Hill-Valley Divide

Geography and political consciousness

Manipur’s geography has contributed significantly to the development of differentiated political and social structures. The central valley constitutes a relatively compact geographical and demographic space. The surrounding hills comprise a much larger geographical area and contain numerous tribal communities possessing distinct customary systems, village institutions and historical experiences.

Geography alone does not produce ethnic conflict. However, geography can shape:

• Patterns of administration
• Political representation
• Access to land
• Economic opportunity
• Communication
• Security
• Identity

In Manipur, the distinction between hills and valley gradually acquired political as well as geographical significance.

Colonial administration reinforced differentiated systems of governance. The valley and hill areas were not administered through identical political arrangements. Different forms of authority and customary practice were recognised in the hills, contributing to political expectations concerning autonomy that continued into the post-colonial period.²

This historical experience remains politically significant. For many valley communities, Manipur represents a historically coherent political entity whose territorial integrity is central to collective identity. For many hill communities, political history emphasises customary autonomy and suspicion of excessive centralisation within the state.

Neither perception can simply be dismissed. Both represent historically developed political consciousness. The challenge is therefore not to decide which historical narrative is legitimate. It is to construct institutions capable of accommodating competing memories and aspirations.

III. The Post-Colonial State and Differentiated Governance

The incorporation of Manipur into the constitutional framework of India did not eliminate the political distinction between hill and valley. The challenge became one of integrating different communities into a common political system while preserving legitimate institutional diversity.

This problem is not unique to Manipur. It is a central feature of the political history of India’s Northeast. Sanjib Baruah’s work on the region has demonstrated that the political challenges of Northeast India cannot be reduced to insurgency or security. They are also related to the ways in which diverse communities negotiate authority, belonging and institutional recognition.³

Manipur represents an especially concentrated example of this wider problem. The constitutional system itself recognised the special circumstances of the Hill Areas through Article 371C of the Constitution.

The existence of Article 371C is politically significant because it acknowledges a fundamental reality: formal equality of institutions does not necessarily produce substantive political accommodation.

The Hill Areas Committee was intended to provide a mechanism through which matters affecting the Hill Areas would receive specific institutional consideration.

The critical question, however, is not merely whether an institution exists. It is whether that institution possesses sufficient:

• Authority
• Resources
• Political credibility
• Constitutional protection
• Capacity to influence decision-making

The debate concerning the Hill Areas Committee and related institutions is therefore central to the future political settlement of Manipur.

IV. Autonomy: Promise and Paradox

Autonomy is frequently proposed as a solution to ethnic conflict. However, autonomy is not a simple administrative formula. It raises several difficult questions:

• Autonomy for whom?
• Over which subjects?
• Within what territorial boundaries?
• With what financial powers?
• Subject to what constitutional guarantees?
• How will minorities within autonomous areas be protected?

These questions are particularly important in Manipur because communities and territorial claims do not always fit into neat geographical categories.

The central paradox is clear. Too little autonomy can create alienation. But poorly designed autonomy can create new boundaries and new disputes.

The objective must therefore be to design autonomy as a mechanism of political confidence rather than ethnic separation. The principle advanced in this article is: autonomy should enable communities to govern matters central to their identity and daily life without creating a political architecture that permanently converts ethnic difference into territorial hostility.

V. Ethnicity, Territoriality and the Politics of Insecurity

The Manipur conflict demonstrates the powerful interaction between ethnicity and territoriality. Political communities often seek security through territorial control. Territorial control reinforces identity. Identity then generates political mobilisation. Political mobilisation can generate competing territorial claims. The cycle becomes increasingly difficult to reverse.

The problem becomes particularly acute when communities begin to believe that political control by another community represents an existential threat. Once politics is interpreted through this lens, compromise becomes difficult. A concession is no longer viewed as a policy adjustment. It becomes a possible step toward collective extinction.

The purpose of a durable political settlement must therefore be to reduce existential insecurity. This requires institutional guarantees. Appeals to goodwill are insufficient. Communities that fear domination require:

• Defined rights
• Enforceable protections
• Representation
• Independent institutions
• Credible security arrangements

The political objective should be to make it rational for communities to pursue security through institutions rather than ethnic mobilisation.

VI. The 2023 Conflict: Trigger and Structural Causes

The controversy surrounding the demand for Scheduled Tribe status for the Meitei community formed an immediate context for the events that led to violence in May 2023. However, the conflict cannot adequately be explained through the Scheduled Tribe issue alone.

The controversy became politically explosive because it intersected with deeper concerns regarding:

• Land
• Constitutional protection
• Political representation
• Identity
• Demography
• Administrative authority
• Historical grievance

It is essential to distinguish between trigger and structural cause. The trigger explains why violence began at a particular moment. Structural causes explain why the political environment had become sufficiently fragile for violence to spread.

The principal structural issues include:

• Hill-valley political relations
• Land and customary rights
• Ethnic political mobilisation
• Demographic anxiety
• Institutional distrust
• Security failures
• Competing territorial aspirations
• The strategic impact of instability in Myanmar

A durable settlement must address structural causes. Otherwise, a future crisis may emerge around a different trigger.

VII. Land: The Most Sensitive Political Question

Land is not merely an economic resource in Manipur. It is connected to:

• Identity
• Ancestry
• Political authority
• Customary institutions
• Economic survival
• Cultural continuity

For tribal communities, land is frequently understood through collective and customary relationships. For valley communities, land concerns are also shaped by geographical concentration and perceptions of demographic and territorial limitation.

The important point is that both sides possess genuine anxieties concerning land, even though those anxieties are fundamentally different. For tribal communities, the concern often relates to protection against dispossession and interference with customary land authority. For valley communities, the concern often relates to geographical limitation, population density and access to land.

A settlement cannot simply select one perspective. It must create an institutional arrangement capable of recognising both. This requires a land governance system based upon:

• Transparency
• Consultation
• Legal certainty
• Protection of customary rights
• Independent dispute resolution

No community should believe that changes in political power can be used unilaterally to alter its fundamental relationship with land.

VIII. The Meitei Perspective: Territory, Identity and Security

A durable peace settlement cannot succeed unless it addresses legitimate Meitei concerns. Failure to do so would produce an agreement perceived in the valley as externally imposed or politically punitive.

Territorial integrity

For many Meiteis, the territorial integrity of Manipur represents a fundamental political concern. This is connected with:

• Historical memory
• Political identity
• Fear of fragmentation
• Anxiety regarding competing territorial claims

Consequently, demands for separate political arrangements may be interpreted not merely as administrative reforms but as possible steps toward the fragmentation of Manipur. Whether or not such an interpretation is objectively correct in every instance, the political perception itself is important. Conflict resolution must address perceived insecurity as well as measurable insecurity.

Any durable settlement must therefore provide explicit reassurance that enhanced autonomy does not automatically mean territorial partition.

Identity and cultural security

The Meitei community also possesses legitimate concerns concerning:

• Language
• Cultural heritage
• Religious traditions
• Historical identity
• Political representation

A peace settlement should not require one community to become culturally insecure in order to provide security to another. The guiding principle should therefore be: protection of Meitei identity and protection of tribal rights are not mutually exclusive objectives. Indeed, a successful settlement must institutionalise both.

Border and demographic concerns

Concerns relating to migration and demographic change have acquired considerable political importance in Manipur. The instability in Myanmar has added complexity to the problem. However, border policy requires careful distinction between:

• National security
• Illegal activity
• Humanitarian displacement
• Cross-border kinship
• Ethnic identity

The India-Myanmar border cuts across historically connected communities. Therefore, border management must not become synonymous with collective ethnic suspicion.

India has a legitimate interest in controlling illegal arms, trafficking, organised crime and unlawful cross-border movement. But criminal responsibility must remain individual or organisational. It cannot be converted into collective ethnic guilt.

IX. The Kuki-Zo Perspective: Security, Land and Autonomy

A sustainable settlement must equally recognise that Kuki-Zo political demands cannot simply be treated as temporary consequences of recent violence. They are connected to deeper concerns regarding:

• Security
• Political representation
• Land
• Autonomy
• Institutional confidence

The security question

The violence since May 2023 transformed the political meaning of security. For displaced and affected families, constitutional assurances are insufficient if they do not believe that their physical safety can be guaranteed.

The essential question becomes: Who will protect us? This question is central to peacebuilding. A community that does not trust state institutions will seek alternative security arrangements. Those arrangements may include:

• Community defence groups
• Informal armed structures
• Ethnic mobilisation
• Parallel authority

Therefore, political accommodation and security reform must proceed together. Neither can succeed alone.

Meaningful autonomy

The demand for autonomy raises a legitimate constitutional question: how can communities exercise meaningful authority over matters central to their identity while remaining part of a larger political entity?

The answer cannot be symbolic decentralisation. Meaningful autonomy requires:

• Defined powers
• Financial capacity
• Institutional protection
• Legal clarity
• Dispute-resolution mechanisms

Autonomy without resources is symbolic. Autonomy without enforceable powers is fragile. Autonomy without constitutional guarantees can be reversed.

The final institutional form must emerge through negotiation. But the principle should be clear: communities should not be required to depend entirely upon the political goodwill of another community for the protection of their fundamental interests.

X. The Naga Dimension: The Limits of a Binary Settlement

The recent violence has created a strong tendency to analyse Manipur through a Meitei-Kuki framework. This is understandable. However, it is insufficient for a permanent political settlement.

Naga communities possess:

• Distinct identities
• Historical experiences
• Territorial interests
• Customary institutions
• Political aspirations

Any major restructuring of hill governance, land administration, political representation or autonomy must therefore involve Naga stakeholders.

The fundamental principle should be: no durable settlement can resolve the grievances of one community by politically excluding another.

The proposed Manipur Compact is consequently not a bilateral peace agreement. It is a multi-community constitutional and political accommodation.

XI. The Collapse of Trust in State Authority

One of the most serious consequences of ethnic violence is the erosion of confidence in state institutions. The Supreme Court, while dealing with matters arising from the violence, addressed concerns relating to relief, rehabilitation and institutional arrangements in a situation it described as sectarian strife.⁴

The broader lesson is clear. When communities cease to believe that the state is impartial, competent, responsive and capable of protecting them, they seek alternative sources of security. This produces a dangerous process of ethnicisation of security.

One community arms because it fears another. The other observes the arming and concludes that it must also prepare. Each defensive measure becomes evidence of offensive intent. The result is a self-sustaining security dilemma.

XII. Security Without Ethnic Ownership

Manipur cannot achieve a durable peace while communities believe that their survival depends upon armed formations identified with their own ethnicity. The long-term objective must therefore be: security without ethnic ownership.

This requires:

• Professional policing
• Impartial law enforcement
• Transitional neutral security guarantees
• Independent oversight
• Representative recruitment
• Equal accountability

The objective is not to eliminate community participation in public institutions. It is to ensure that the legitimacy of security institutions derives from law and constitutional authority rather than ethnic allegiance.

XIII. Disarmament: A Political as Well as Security Process

Disarmament cannot be treated simply as a technical exercise. A community will not voluntarily surrender weapons if it believes that another community remains armed, that state protection is unreliable, or that its political future remains uncertain.

Therefore, political accommodation and disarmament must reinforce one another. A credible programme should involve four stages.

Stage One: Stabilisation

The immediate objectives should be:

• Prevention of violence
• Protection of civilians
• Security of transport routes
• Prevention of armed mobilisation

Stage Two: Verification

An independent mechanism should establish:

• Categories of weapons
• Sources of weapons
• Armed formations
• Compliance with ceasefire or disengagement arrangements

Stage Three: Surrender and rehabilitation

A defined and transparent period should enable the surrender of illegally held weapons. Where appropriate, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes should be considered. However, serious criminal responsibility must remain subject to law.

Stage Four: Equal enforcement

After the surrender period, the law must apply equally to all armed organisations and individuals. The central principle should be: one law for every armed actor. There can be no ethnically differentiated standard of legality.

XIV. Displacement and the Danger of Permanent Segregation

Displacement is not merely a humanitarian problem. It is a political problem. The longer communities remain separated, the greater the danger that temporary displacement becomes permanent segregation.

Children grow up outside their original neighbourhoods, without contact with other communities, within narratives of collective victimhood and surrounded by memories of violence. The conflict can then become intergenerational, producing generational segregation.

A durable settlement must therefore include a serious and phased programme of rehabilitation, reconstruction, return and reintegration. However, return must not be forced. Premature return may produce renewed violence. Permanent displacement may institutionalise separation.

The appropriate principle is: voluntary, dignified and secure return wherever conditions permit, accompanied by durable alternatives where return remains unsafe or impossible.

XV. A Framework for Rehabilitation

The rehabilitation programme should contain five phases.

Phase One: Security assessment

Each locality should be assessed independently. Factors should include:

• Physical security
• Community confidence
• Infrastructure
• Risk of renewed violence

Phase Two: Reconstruction

Essential infrastructure should be restored:

• Housing
• Schools
• Healthcare
• Roads
• Public utilities

Phase Three: Voluntary return

Return should be voluntary, dignified and secure.

Phase Four: Livelihood recovery

Families cannot rebuild peace while remaining economically destitute. Support should include:

• Employment
• Agriculture
• Small enterprise
• Education
• Healthcare

Phase Five: Social reintegration

Immediate emotional reconciliation should not be demanded. The first objective should be peaceful coexistence. Trust can develop gradually.

XVI. The India-Myanmar Border and the Strategic Dimension

Manipur’s conflict cannot be separated completely from its strategic environment. The instability in Myanmar has created challenges relating to:

• Displacement
• Arms
• Trafficking
• Cross-border movement
• Criminal networks

At the same time, the borderlands contain communities with longstanding social and kinship relationships extending across the international boundary. This requires a policy based upon three simultaneous principles.

Security

India must strengthen surveillance, intelligence, border infrastructure and inter-agency coordination.

Administration

There must be clear documentation, consistent legal procedures and professional enforcement.

Humanitarian responsibility

Policy must recognise that civilian displacement is not identical to criminality. Nor is cross-border kinship itself evidence of a security offence.

The objective must be: secure borders without collective suspicion.

XVII. Narcotics, Criminal Economies and Ethnic Stereotyping

The narcotics economy must be confronted firmly. However, criminal networks should not be transformed into collective ethnic accusations. The legitimate targets of investigation and prosecution are:

• Traffickers
• Financiers
• Organised criminal networks
• Corrupt officials
• Armed protectors of criminal activity

The principle must be: fight criminality without criminalising communities. This is essential for conflict resolution. Collective accusations strengthen ethnic mobilisation. Impartial law enforcement weakens criminal networks without producing collective resentment.

XVIII. Why the Pre-2023 Status Quo Is Insufficient

A simple return to the pre-2023 institutional arrangement may appear administratively convenient. It is unlikely to resolve the political crisis. The principal reason is the destruction of trust.

For many Meiteis, the earlier arrangement represented territorial unity and political continuity. For many Kuki-Zo communities, it represented insufficient autonomy and institutional vulnerability.

Therefore, the objective should not be to recreate the old Manipur. The objective should be to create a political order capable of preventing the next conflict.

XIX. Why Partition Is Also an Inadequate Solution

The alternative approach is territorial or political separation. This presents equally serious problems, including:

• Overlapping territorial claims
• Mixed populations
• Minority communities
• New boundaries
• Economic disruption
• Future territorial disputes

Ethnic separation does not necessarily eliminate insecurity. It may simply relocate insecurity to a new boundary. The alternative proposed here is therefore: autonomy without partition.

XX. Comparative Lessons

Manipur cannot import a peace agreement from another society. However, comparative cases provide useful principles.

Mizoram: Political settlement matters

The Mizo Peace Accord demonstrates that long-term conflict can be transformed when security measures are combined with political negotiation, credible commitments, democratic participation and reintegration. The lesson is: armed conflict cannot be permanently resolved by security operations alone.

Northern Ireland: Institutions before historical agreement

Northern Ireland demonstrates that communities do not need to agree completely on history, identity or national aspiration before they can share political institutions. The relevant lesson is: communities that cannot agree on the past may nevertheless agree on rules for the future.

Aceh: Autonomy and credible implementation

The Aceh settlement demonstrates the potential value of meaningful autonomy, political participation, demilitarisation and implementation mechanisms. The principal lesson is: autonomy succeeds only when commitments are credible.

South Africa: Truth and reconciliation

South Africa demonstrates the importance of recognising suffering. Reconciliation does not require forgetting. It requires ensuring that the past does not become a permanent justification for future violence.

Bosnia: The danger of frozen ethnic division

Bosnia demonstrates both the value and limitations of ethnic power-sharing. Institutions can stop violence. However, excessively rigid ethnic arrangements may freeze division. The lesson for Manipur is: political accommodation must not become permanent ethnic segregation.

XXI. The Manipur Compact

The central policy contribution of this article is the proposal for a comprehensive political framework: the Manipur Compact. The Compact should contain ten pillars.

Pillar One: Territorial Integrity

The territorial and constitutional unity of Manipur should receive explicit political and legal protection. This would address a central concern of the Meitei population. However, territorial integrity must not mean institutional rigidity. A state can remain territorially united while accommodating different governance arrangements, protected communities and asymmetric institutions. Therefore: unity does not require uniformity.

Pillar Two: Meaningful Hill Autonomy

Hill communities should receive enhanced and clearly defined authority. The precise constitutional mechanism should emerge through negotiation. Potential areas may include:

• Local development
• Education
• Culture
• Agriculture
• Health
• Local infrastructure
• Economic planning
• Customary institutions

The essential requirement is that autonomy must be real, defined, funded and constitutionally protected.

Pillar Three: Financial Autonomy and Equitable Development

Political authority without financial capacity is symbolic. A formula-based system should therefore be considered to ensure predictable funding, transparent allocation, independent auditing and public accountability. A possible institution could be the Manipur Autonomy and Equitable Development Fund. Its purpose would not be to create parallel states. Its purpose would be to reduce perceptions that development depends upon ethnic proximity to political power.

Pillar Four: Land and Customary Rights

A permanent Manipur Land and Customary Rights Commission should be considered. It should include representatives of relevant communities, constitutional and legal experts, land specialists and independent members. Its functions could include land disputes, customary rights, major development projects, rehabilitation and environmental disputes.

The guiding principle should be: no community should believe that its fundamental relationship with land can be altered through unilateral political power.

Pillar Five: Protection of Meitei Identity

The settlement should explicitly protect language, culture, heritage, traditional institutions and legitimate political interests. Peace cannot be achieved by replacing one insecurity with another.

Pillar Six: The Manipur Council of Communities

A permanent consultative institution should be established, including representatives of Meitei, Kuki-Zo, Naga and other recognised stakeholder communities. The Council should consider matters relating to land, migration, demography, cultural rights, major development projects and institutional restructuring. It should not replace the elected Assembly. Its function should be conflict prevention through structured dialogue.

Pillar Seven: Neutral Security

A transitional security framework should guarantee protection of all civilians, professional policing, impartial law enforcement and independent oversight. Where necessary, transitional arrangements should provide additional neutral security assurance until confidence in ordinary institutions is restored. The objective is security institutions trusted because they are impartial, not because they belong to one community.

Pillar Eight: Universal Disarmament

The principle must be absolute: no community can retain armed formations while demanding that another community disarm. The programme should include verification, surrender, demobilisation, rehabilitation and enforcement.

Pillar Nine: Truth, Justice and Reconciliation

A Manipur Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission should be established through an agreed legal framework. Its functions should include examination of violence, displacement, institutional failures and victim testimony. Its governing principle should be individual accountability without collective guilt. The Commission should establish truth. Courts should determine criminal responsibility. Society should pursue reconciliation.

Pillar Ten: Economic Reconstruction and Interdependence

Peace must produce visible benefits. Priority should be given to roads, markets, agriculture, healthcare, education, digital connectivity and employment. Economic reconstruction should deliberately encourage shared institutions and interdependence. Peace becomes more sustainable when communities possess a practical interest in stability.

XXII. Women as Peacebuilders

Women have historically occupied an important position in Manipuri civil society and public mobilisation. A peace process should therefore ensure meaningful participation by:

• Meira Paibi groups
• Tribal women’s organisations
• Church-based women’s groups
• Civil society organisations

Women should not be treated solely as victims. They are also mediators, community leaders, social organisers and peacebuilders. A Manipur Women’s Peace Forum could provide a permanent cross-community platform.

XXIII. Youth and the Prevention of Generational Conflict

The greatest long-term danger is the inheritance of hostility. Young people who grow up exclusively within segregated social environments may inherit fear, victimhood, historical grievance and distrust.

A durable settlement should therefore invest in:

• Educational exchanges
• Sports
• Skill development
• Universities
• Entrepreneurship
• Cultural programmes

The objective is not to erase identity. It is to establish a different principle: identity does not require hostility.

XXIV. A Five-Year Implementation Roadmap

A peace agreement without implementation will fail. The proposed settlement should therefore proceed in phases.

Year One: Stabilisation

• Prevent violence
• Protect civilians
• Secure transport routes
• Begin humanitarian rehabilitation
• Establish dialogue mechanisms
• Begin arms verification

Year Two: Political Negotiation

• Autonomy
• Land protection
• Security arrangements
• Financial mechanisms
• Institutional guarantees

Year Three: Institution Building

• Enhanced autonomy institutions
• Council of Communities
• Land and Customary Rights Commission
• Reconciliation mechanisms

Year Four: Reintegration

• Economic reconstruction
• Rehabilitation and return
• Educational recovery
• Shared institutions

Year Five: Consolidation

• Independent review
• Resolution of outstanding disputes
• Institutional strengthening
• Normalisation of security arrangements

XXV. The Grand Political Bargain

Every durable settlement requires compromise. The Manipur Compact must therefore produce identifiable gains for all principal stakeholders.

The Meitei community receives

• Explicit protection of territorial integrity
• Protection of cultural identity
• Serious and professional border management
• Neutral security guarantees
• Institutional reassurance that autonomy does not mean partition

The Kuki-Zo communities receive

• Meaningful and protected autonomy
• Strong protection of land and customary rights
• Credible security guarantees
• Greater financial and institutional capacity
• A permanent political voice

The Naga communities receive

• Full participation in political negotiations
• Protection of customary institutions
• Protection against unilateral restructuring

The Government of India receives

• Restoration of legitimate state authority
• Reduced internal security pressure
• Better border governance
• Greater regional stability
• A framework for preventing recurrence

XXVI. What Both Sides Must Give Up

No settlement can succeed if every community expects to receive all its demands. A durable agreement will require concessions.

The Meitei side must accept that political unity cannot mean complete institutional uniformity.

Kuki-Zo political leadership must accept that meaningful autonomy need not necessarily require the destruction of Manipur’s territorial integrity.

All armed actors must accept that political grievances cannot justify permanent private militarisation.

All communities must accept that individual criminal responsibility cannot become collective ethnic guilt.

The Government of India must accept that security management alone cannot resolve a political conflict.

These are difficult concessions. But peace is always more difficult than victory narratives suggest.

XXVII. The Role of the Government of India

The Government of India possesses a unique responsibility because the conflict has exceeded the capacity of ordinary state-level politics to resolve it independently. New Delhi must therefore perform three roles.

Guarantor

It must guarantee constitutional commitments, security and implementation.

Mediator

It must facilitate dialogue without appearing to impose an ethnic victory.

Enforcer

It must ensure equal application of law, disarmament and protection of civilians.

The credibility of the Government of India will depend significantly upon whether communities believe that it acts as a constitutional guarantor rather than the political ally of any one community.

XXVIII. The Role of Civil Society

Political agreements alone will not restore social relationships. Civil society must therefore participate in:

• Dialogue
• Rehabilitation
• Women’s participation
• Youth engagement
• Historical documentation
• Community reconciliation

However, civil society organisations must also recognise their responsibility. Peacebuilding cannot succeed if organisations become permanent instruments of ethnic mobilisation. The challenge is to create civil society for peace, not mobilisation for conflict.

XXIX. A Framework for Measuring Peace

Peace should not be measured simply by the absence of shooting. A Manipur Peace and Reconciliation Index could measure progress according to:

Security

• Reduction in violence
• Arms recovery
• Civilian confidence

Humanitarian recovery

• Return
• Housing
• Education
• Healthcare

Political accommodation

• Functioning institutions
• Participation
• Dispute resolution

Social reconciliation

• Community interaction
• Women’s participation
• Youth programmes

Economic recovery

• Markets
• Employment
• Infrastructure

Such an index would provide an evidence-based mechanism for evaluating progress.

XXX. The Central Lesson

The central lesson of Manipur is that a society divided by insecurity cannot be reunited merely through administrative orders.

Political authority must be legitimate. Security must be impartial. Autonomy must be credible. Land rights must be protected. Justice must be visible. Rehabilitation must be real. Dialogue must include every major stakeholder.

Most importantly: no community should be required to accept permanent insecurity as the price of another community’s security.

XXXI. Conclusion

The conflict in Manipur cannot be permanently resolved by deciding which community possesses the stronger historical narrative. History can explain conflict. It cannot, by itself, design peace. The challenge is to construct institutions that make compromise safer than confrontation.

The Meitei population must be able to say: our homeland, identity and territorial future are secure.

The Kuki-Zo population must be able to say: our land, security and political dignity are guaranteed.

The Naga communities must be able to say: our interests were not sacrificed in negotiations conducted by others.

Every displaced family must be able to say: our future will not be permanently determined by the violence of the past.

The proposed Manipur Compact rests upon four fundamental principles:

Manipur does not require the disappearance of ethnic identities. It requires institutions capable of managing those identities without allowing difference to become a justification for violence.

The ultimate objective cannot be the political victory of one community. It must be the creation of a political system in which no community believes that its survival depends upon the defeat of another.

That is the essential foundation of a settlement that can be considered not merely expedient, but fair. And it is only a settlement regarded as sufficiently fair by all principal communities that has a realistic prospect of becoming lasting.

Notes

1. Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, “Government of India Notifies a Commission of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 to Inquire into the Incidents of Violence in the State of Manipur on 03.05.2023 and Thereafter,” Press Information Bureau, June 4, 2023. ↑

2. Sanjib Baruah, Durable Disorder: Understanding the Politics of Northeast India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005); Sanjib Baruah, In the Name of the Nation: India and Its Northeast (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2020). ↑

3. Baruah, Durable Disorder. ↑

4. Dinganglung Gangmei v. Mutum Churamani Meetei, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 540 of 2023 and connected matters, Supreme Court of India, judgment dated August 7, 2023. ↑

Selected Bibliography

Books

Baruah, Sanjib. Durable Disorder: Understanding the Politics of Northeast India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Baruah, Sanjib. In the Name of the Nation: India and Its Northeast. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2020.

Scholarly Articles and Chapters

Baruah, Sanjib. “When Civilizational Nationalism Meets Subnationalism: The Crisis in Manipur.” Studies in Indian Politics 12, no. 1 (2024).

Haokip, Thongkholal. “Dereliction of Duties or the Politics of ‘Political Quadrangle’? The Governor, Hill Areas Committee and Upsurge in the Hills of Manipur.” Indian Journal of Public Administration 63, no. 3 (2017).

Haokip, Thongkholal. “Ethnocracy in Deeply Divided Societies: The Dynamics of Ethnopolitics in Manipur.” In Vernacular Politics in Northeast India: Democracy, Ethnicity, and Indigeneity, edited by Jelle J. P. Wouters. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022.

Haokip, Thongkholal. “Territoriality, Conflict and Citizenship in the India–Myanmar Borderlands.” Journal of Indian and Asian Studies 4, no. 1 (2023).

Constitutional and Legal Sources

Constitution of India.

Constitution of India, Article 371C.

Government of India. Manipur Legislative Assembly (Hill Areas Committee) Order, 1972.

Dinganglung Gangmei v. Mutum Churamani Meetei. Writ Petition (Civil) No. 540 of 2023 and connected matters. Supreme Court of India. August 7, 2023.

Government and Official Sources

Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs. Annual Report 2023–2024. New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs.

Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs. “Government of India Notifies a Commission of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 to Inquire into the Incidents of Violence in the State of Manipur on 03.05.2023 and Thereafter.” Press Information Bureau. June 4, 2023.

Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs. “Year End Review 2023.” Press Information Bureau. December 2023.

Government of Manipur. Commission of Inquiry (Manipur Violence), 2023.