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Title of the Article: Exploring the relations between border management and security threat in the Indian Northeast region

Title of the Article: Exploring the relations between border management and security threat in the Indian Northeast region

 

 

 

 

 

 

Author:

Aribam Uttam Sharma

Research Scholar,

Department of National Security Studies,

Manipur University, Canchipur, Imphal, India

Email: uttam53210@gmail.com

Contact number: +919862988741/+917005235718

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Author Details:

Aribam Uttam Sharma is currently pursuing his PhD in the Department of National Security Studies at Manipur University. His research title is “Management of India-China border along the McMahon Line in Arunachal Pradesh since 2008.” He has completed his post-graduation studies in the Department of National Security Studies at Manipur University. He has secured a first-class topper, and he has secured a prestigious Gold Medal. He has also cleared his UGC-NET JRF in the subject of Defence and Strategic Studies. He is pursuing his PhD with a UGC JRF scholarship.

 

He is pursuing his PhD under the supervision of Dr. SarvsureshthDhammi, Assistant Professor, Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, University of Allahabad, and under the co-supervision of Dr NameirakpamBijenMeetei, Professor, Department of Political Science, Manipur University. Previously, he worked as a Guest Lecturer in the Department of National Security Studies at Rajiv Gandhi University.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I (Aribam Uttam Sharma) expressed my heartfelt gratitude to my PhD supervisor, Dr. SarvsureshthDhammi, Assistant Professor, University of Allahabad, India, for supporting my research work in writing such articles. At every step, he provided me with the required study materials for writing this article and helped me a lot in writing the article.

 

I hereby express my satisfaction to my institute (Manipur University) for providing me online access to various journals and other related software like Grammarly.

I have written this article with the guidance of my supervisor, Dr. SarvsureshthDhammi.

 

And I declare that I do not have any conflict of interest.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Exploring the relations between border management and security threat in the Indian Northeast region

 

Abstract:

The porous and unregulated borders of northeast India serve as the main facilitator of all the problems faced in northeast India, like insurgency, illegal immigration, and drug issues. This article aims to find the correlation between border management efforts and the security threats that are faced in the border areas. Both qualitative and quantitative data are collected and observed thoroughly by the researcher. It has been found that there is a general negative correlation between border management efforts and security threats faced in the border area.

Keywords: Border management, North-east India, Insurgency, Illegal migration, Drug trafficking

 

  1. Introduction

The recent Meitei-Kuki ethnic clashes, which started on 3rd May 2023, have left 226 people dead, 1500 people injured, 60,000 people displaced, and 28 people missing and are considered a manifestation of the problems of illegal migration and drug cultivation in the border areas, which have been there for the last many years.[1] The ethnic violence once again underscored the importance of border management, especially in the Indo-Myanmar border. The northeast region of India, which shares borders with China, Myanmar, and Bangladesh, has given rise to a number of security problems because of its strategic location, difficult topography, extensive forested areas, and ethnically diverse cross-border population. In addition to ensuring border security and development, proper border management also entails safeguarding the border from dangerous threats and allowing the entry of beneficial elements such as trade and commerce. The security threat in this article refers to both the traditional security threat(directed from China at the India-China border) and the non-traditional security threat(insurgency, drug trafficking and illegal migration).

 

Understanding this topic is crucial for the following reasons: First, for a long time since independence, the northeast border states have felt isolated from the heart of India, and understanding the security issues will help in forging strong ties between mainland India and Northeast India both culturally and politically. Second, border management has an unbreakable connection to national security; inadequate border management is an Achilles heel for India’s national security.  Third, the region has been infected by problems such as insurgencies, illegal migration, drug trafficking and other organised crime; understanding such things in detail will help in addressing such complex problems. Fourth, in-depth research on this issue is critical, particularly given India’s foreign policy and strategic holdings in Southeast Asia as part of its Act East Policy.

 

1.1  Literature review

Although some studies have already been conducted on the topic, which includes the following: Pushpita Das, in her article titled “Security Challenges and the Management of the India-Myanmar Border,” strongly suggests that the insurgency, drugs and arms trafficking, and other criminal activity that arises as a result of the porous and poorly guarded and vulnerable border is extremely cancerous for India’s future and calls for strong action from the Indian government.[2]  N. S. Jamwal,

in his article “Border Management: Dilemma of Guarding the India-Bangladesh Border,” emphasises the need for comprehensive border management and balancing security measures with development initiatives due to the complex nature of the India-Bangladesh border.[3] Pushpita Das’ paper, ‘India-Bangladesh Border Management: A Review of Government’s Response,’ emphasised the need for a pragmatic and people-centred approach to border management. This article also discusses the group of ministers’ report on improving border management along the India-Bangladesh border.[4] Pushpita Das, in her article titled “ Management of India-China Border Area: A Case Study of Arunachal Pradesh”, highlighted that the poorly managed India-China border regarding underdeveloped states, territories, and ethnic tension struggles, as well as the integration of the border population into the wider scope, constitutes one of the factors adding to the instability and security problems in Arunachal Pradesh’s region.[5]Jeetendra Gupta & Dr Rajesh Deb Barman, in their article titled, “A STUDY ON BORDER MANAGEMENT AND ITS IMPORTANCE OF SECURITY IN BORDER MANAGEMENT”, highlighted the social ills of illegal immigration, demographic change, insurgency risk, the geostrategic significance of the Siliguri Corridor, local poverty that encourages continuous smuggling, recurring border disputes, and the pressing need for joint border management and cooperation for peace and security along the Indo-Bangladesh border.[6] Pushpita Das, in her book titled “India’s Approach to Border Management: From Barriers to Bridges”, stresses the badly managed border during the early years of independence, i.e., keeping border areas undeveloped in order to use them as a buffer zone against security threats, which has aggravated border security concerns.[7]

 

1.2 Research Gap

Earlier literature highlighted the security threats and problems facing the northeastern Indian border areas very well, but none of the previous literature focused on the linkages between border management and the security threats that are taking place throughout the northeastern region. The study aims to understand the linkage between border management and the security threat in the North-east region. The study also suggested certain steps to strengthen overall border management in the northeast area, taking into account the kinds of threats it encounters and the geopolitical factors of its neighbours.

 

1.3 Research Methodology

 

This study uses exploratory research, which aims to identify the linkages between the border management effort and the security threat facing the region, using both primary and secondary data. Primary data compose reports and publications,’ which are official government documents accessible on the website. The secondary data are collected from various sources, such as research papers, think tank reports and news articles regarding specific issues. To get as near to an original finding as possible, the researcher use both qualitative and quantitative data in a more in-depth study. The data are being observed to identify what type of relations exists between border management and the security threat. The research also relied on the content analysis of the qualitative data to arrive at more accurate findings.

 

1.4 Research Question

The study involves one research question

  1. What is the correlation between border management and security threats facing the northeast region?

 

This research carefully examines the current trend of progress in the border management efforts by the government of India regarding the northeast region and also carefully analyses the trend in the various security threats which have been facing the region since the 1950s.

 

  1. MATERIAL AND METHOD

2.1 A Historical Context:

The trend of poor border management started well during the late 19th and early 20th century during British colonial administration. The approach of the colonial ruler during that time regarding the borders was a combination of a twofold strategy: the first one was serving the border areas as buffer zones against external threats to the British, and the second one was the arbitrary demarcation of the boundary with neighbouring countries, which probably laid the seeds of future conflict with neighbouring countries, especially China. In the early colonial period, this region formed part of the Bengal Province and later became a separate Province of Assam in 1874. The Hills areas were separated into “excluded area” and “partially excluded area” in 1935. In contrast, the former came under absolute British administration, and the latter was granted limited representation systems under British administration control. The Britishers were not interested in managing the border properly; instead, they focused on maintaining their control over the entire North-East region of India. They carried out their administration over the northeast region from the various main city centres in Assam Plains and Shillong. Even after signing the Shimla Convention in 1914, the British did not consolidate its position up to Tawang and let the Tibetans administer Tawang. The colonial rulers imposed the Inner Line Regulation in the hills areas of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland and Mizoram in 1873.[8] The motives behind such actions were not only the non-interference and preservation of the tribals but also to isolate them from mainland India so that the influence of the freedom struggle movement did not reach them.[9] The hills area of Arunachal Pradesh was kept a buffer zone by the British against the Chinese. The North-East region is treated separately from the other regions of British India.

 

The colonial rulers established various boundary lines along the India-China boundary, such as the McMahon Line, the Indo-Myanmar border as the Pemberton Line, and the Indo-Bangladesh border. However, the boundary was not delineated properly on the ground, as the demarcation was an arbitrary one, which made the boundary line blurry. The McMahon line was created by drawing the line on a small-scale map using a thick nibbed marker by Sir Henry McMahon. In fact, a clear boundary does not even exist in the ground, and in reality, it is still an imaginary line.[10] In the case of the Pemberton line, the boundary line was marked by physical pillars.[11] Some areas were not well defined in the ground due to the complex geographical features encompassing hilly, dense jungle terrain and rivers, and the boundary line did not reflect local realities because it ignored ethnic and cultural divisions among the people.[12]

 

2.2 Border Management after Independence

After independence, the Indian government did not manage the border properly, which has been attributed to the following reasons: First, the Indian government believed the best way to protect the borders is to maintain good relations with the neighbouring countries; if the bilateral relations with the neighbouring countries is good, then the border will be peaceful and vice versa. Such a mindset led to the neglect of maintaining defence and security of the international border. Second, the newly formed Indian government faced a massive challenge while institutionalising its blurry colonial-era frontier in the Northeast regions. The integration of all the hilly regions and the clear demarcation of the border was complicated by the contested border, rough terrain, socio-economic reasons, and the close affinity of the people living in the border region with the other sides. The most important factor responsible for the massive challenge of national integration in the northeast region is the British separation and isolation policy that it had imposed on the region before independence. In addition to this, there was a major hardship for the government during the time of partition, and the massive challenge of consolidating the whole nation was itself a daunting task, which probably compelled the independent ruler to neglect the borders. 14.5 million Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus are said to have crossed the borders, either willingly or under pressure. In order to acknowledge the suffering of the people at the time and to permit their travel, the national leader kept the border open and soft with what was then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Similarly, the Indo-Myanmar border was open since neither the Indian nor Myanmar governments had managed and administered a substantial portion of the border. Thirdly, the Indian political elites have no idea as to what extent the Indian border lies. It took three years after independence to consolidate and administer the Tawang region. It was only when China annexed Tibet the Indian government sent its military expedition, headed by Assistant Political Officer Major Bob Khathing, to occupy the Tawang region before the Chinese could come and occupy them.[13]

 

During the early period, the Union government entrusted the responsibility of managing the border to the respective state government. The Eastern Frontier Rifles (West Bengal), Assam Rifles, and Tripura Rifles were responsible for policing the Indo-Bangladesh border. The Ladakh militia, CRPF, Uttar Pradesh Armed Constabulary, and Assam Rifles were assigned to monitor the India-China border in Ladakh, Uttar Pradesh, and Arunachal Pradesh (formerly known as the North East Frontier Agency). Only three battalions of the Assam Rifles guarded India’s border with Myanmar, posing security threats. The Assam Rifles were primarily responsible for counter-insurgency operations against Naga insurgents, with headquarters in Kohima, Imphal, and Aizawl, leaving the border with Myanmar inadequately secured.[14]

 

It was only after 57 years of independence that a new dedicated department of border management was created under the Ministry of Home Affairs in 2004. This department solely focuses on issues related to international land borders, coastal borders, border policing, guarding, infrastructure related to roads, fencing, floodlighting, Border Outposts (BOPs) and Company Operating Bases (COBs). It is also responsible for the implementation of the Border Area Development Programme(BADP). The current border management approach of the Indian government is based on a combination of both development and security approaches. Over the past few years, the border management practices of the Indian government have improved significantly, but there is still a long way to go.

 

2.3 Linkage of Security Concerns and Border Management in the Northeast Region:

According to the Ministry of Home Affairs in its 2020-2021 report, almost 60% of the international border of India’s northeast is porous, and it has caused fragile security conditions in India’s Northeast regions.[15] The porous border acts as a conducive environment for many illegal and criminal activities. The lack of restriction on the borders simply means anybody can cross them and carry out their activities as per their will. In the Arthashastra, Kautilya focused extensively on the fortification of territory to defend against threats.[16] A nation with no border fortification serves as a magnet to all possible threats that it may potentially face in the future. Ever since its independence, the North-East India region has been a region of conflict, disturbance, and underdevelopment. The conflicts, violence and unrest have dragged down the development efforts in northeast India.

 

2.3.1 Chinese threat in the India-China border in Arunachal Pradesh

The nature of the threat which India faces on the India-China border is more of a conventional military threat from the Chinese. The problems associated with the India-China border in Arunachal Pradesh have been attributed to various reasons. First, the presence of disputed borders between the two countries is the main reason for the security problems at the borders. The India-China border in Arunachal Pradesh was also known as the McMahon Line, which was delineated on the map, but in reality, it was unclear on the ground. While India accepted it, China rejected the McMahon line. Second, Geopolitical tensions between the two countries have fueled the problems and tensions on the India-China border.

 

Following the humiliating defeat of the 1962 war, the Indian government decided not to develop the border areas, fearing that it would enrage the Chinese and that China would use the developed infrastructure on the Indian side to advance further into Indian territory if the two countries fought again in the future. It was only later in 2008 that the Indian government realised it was losing its ground by not developing infrastructure in the border areas; after that, it started developing infrastructure in the border areas in Arunachal Pradesh. China employs both military and non-military coercive measures against India, depending on the moment and context, to maximise outcomes. Chinese incursion on the Indian side, along with its combination of other strategies like renaming territories, denying visas to Arunachalis to visit China, and enforcing its claims in Arunachal from time to time.

 

Figure 1: Number of Chinese incursions in the eastern sector of the India-China border

Sources: Brethouwer, Jan-Tino, Robbert Fokkink, Kevin Greene, Roy Lindelauf, Caroline Tornquist, and V. S. Subrahmanian. 2022. “Rising Tension in the Himalayas: A Geospatial Analysis of Chinese Border Incursions Into India.” PLoS ONE 17 (11): e0274999. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0274999.

 

 

Figure 2: Chinese renaming of places in India

 

Year Region Number of Places renamed Details Disputed with
April 2017 Arunachal Pradesh(India) 6 China renamed six locations in Arunachal Pradesh to emphasise its claim to the region, using Mandarin, Tibetan, and pinyin. India
December 2021 Arunachal Pradesh(India) 15 Fifteen places were renamed, including residential areas, rivers, and mountains, to reinforce its territorial claim over ‘Zangnan’ (South Tibet). India
April 2023 Arunachal Pradesh(India) 11 China renamed 11 more places in Arunachal Pradesh, again involving various geographical features such as rivers, mountains, and towns. India
April 2024 Arunachal Pradesh(India) 30 In a continued effort, China renamed 30 places, including towns, rivers, lakes, and mountain passes, to assert its claim over the region further. India

Sources: The table has been compiled by the researcher from various sources.

 

The Indian government’s border management effort along the India-China border in Arunachal has strengthened in the last decades.  According to the Arunachal Pradesh government, road development in the state has improved by 65% during the previous eight years, from 2015-2016 to 2022-2023. This includes both national and state highways. During 2015-2016, the length of the road network was around 30,692 km, and by 2022-2023, it had increased to 50,555 km, with 2,506 km of road located in border areas.[17] The effective completion of the Nichiphu and Sela tunnels, as well as the successful functioning of Arunachal Pradesh’s seven advanced landing sites, demonstrate India’s seriousness in dealing with China.  The entire India-China border is guarded by the Indo-Tibetan Border Police, which has around 163 border outposts all along the border, of which a substantial number of border outposts are in Arunachal Pradesh, and also there are plans to have an additional 54 new border outposts in Arunachal Pradesh.[18] Another compelling proof of India’s commitment to the border management of Arunachal Pradesh is shown in Figure 3.

 

Figure 3: Year-wise, details of funds allocated under the Border Infrastructure and Management (BIM) Scheme to secure border areas of North Eastern (NE) States, including Assam, during the last three years( Rs in crores).

  2019-2020 2020-2021 2021-2022
  1. India-China Border
72.20 42.87 249.12
  1. Indo-Myanmar Border
20 17.38 50.00
  1. Indo-Bangladesh Border*
407.07 294.87 303.18
                        total 499.27 355.12 602.30

 

* Figures for Indo- Bangladesh Border include those for NE States and West Bengal.

Sources: “Allocation of Funds to Security of Borders.” n.d. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1813625.

 

The Indian government’s substantial improvement in the border management along the India-China border along the eastern sector has further narrowed down the gap regarding the balance of power with China due to its long-standing geopolitical rivalry.

 

2.3.2 Insurgency

The main sources of non-traditional security threats like insurgency, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration emerge from the Indo-Myanmar border and the Indo-Bangladesh border. During the early period of the start of the insurgency during the 1950s, they made use of the porous border to cross into countries like Myanmar and Bangladesh and set up their bases there. They made use of the porous borders to infiltrate the Indian side, carried out an ambush against Security forces and ran back towards their camp. They frequently engage in hit-and-run tactics while utilising porous and unregulated borders. Indian security forces carried out massive counter-insurgency operations from time to time on its soil, but it only displaced the settlement of the insurgency groups into neighbouring countries. The international border has played the role of an essential factor in the insurgency-related violence in the northeast region. The porous border, as well as the linkage with other armed groups in Myanmar, proves to be a force multiplier for the insurgency groups.[19] Broadly speaking, some of the insurgents who attacked security forces have excellent knowledge regarding the terrain and topography of the border areas, even better than the security forces and even the government intelligence agency, as they have been operating in the region for more than 40 years. During the 1990s, insurgent groups in the northeast were at their peak strength, but intense counter-insurgency operations by Indian security forces, as well as the heavy presence of Indian security forces, as well as a comprehensive effort by the local administration and various NGOs, resulted in a significant decrease in insurgent activities and related violence. One of the most significant factors which resulted in the decline of insurgent activities is the deployment of security forces in border areas and the tightening of measures, including increasing surveillance and fencing in some parts of the border areas.

 

Over the last few decades, the border management effort has increased, especially at the Indo-Bangladesh border, and there has also been some minor improvement in the case of the Indo-Myanmar border. The installation of a fence along the Indo-Bangladesh border began in 1986, and 3141 km of sanctioned fence have been built since 2021.[20]  The Indo-Bangladesh border is guarded by the Border Security Forces, which consists of 82 battalions and 1011 border outposts.[21] The Indo-Myanmar border is guarded by around 15 battalions of Assam Rifles, which have been organised through 83 Company Operating Bases(COBs) in selected areas to protect the local population and control the access route for infiltration. Following the Meitei-Kuki ethnic hostilities, which began on May 3, 2024, the Indian government announced the abolition of the Free Movement Regime (FMR) and the fencing of the entire Indo-Myanmar border. Apart from the security measures, there have also been efforts to develop the border areas, as seen in Figure 3. The Indo-Bangladesh border is better managed than the Indo-Myanmar border, as the Indo-Myanmar border is complex.

 

Figure 4: Insurgency Incident reported by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India

 

 

Figure 5: Insurgent Incident rate in the following years

According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of Indian, annual report 2022-23, the security situation in the North Eastern States has significantly improved since 2014. Insurgency events have decreased by 76% from 2014 to 2022. During this time, Security Forces casualties have declined by 90% and civilian deaths by 97%.[22] Over the years, a positive trend regarding insurgent incidents has been observed. As evident in Figure 4 and Figure 5, insurgency-related incidents have seen a sharp decline.

 

2.3.3 Illegal immigration

Illegal migration is one of the most prevalent challenges seen, particularly on the Indo-Bangladesh border, and it is also one of the most basic issues encountered today on the Indo-Myanmar border. Coming first for the Indo-Bangladesh border, the influx of illegal immigrants was at a peak during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, during which it is widely believed millions of Bangladeshi refugees migrated to India while taking advantage of the porosity of the Indo-Bangladesh border during that time. However, it is very difficult to estimate the number of illegal immigrants staying in northeast India, as it varies from various sources. In 2001, the Task Force on Border Management estimated that there were 15 million illegal migrants in northeast India.[23] About 20 million illegal immigrants from Bangladesh reside in India, according to a 2016 statement made to the Indian parliament by Kiren Rijiju, the country’s then-Minister of State for Home Affairs.[24] Under the Assam Accord, about 1.4 lakh illegal immigrants who entered Assam after March 25, 1971, have been identified for removal from voting lists, with over 30,000 already deported.[25] The illegal migration phenomenon poses a great national security threat.

 

It is very difficult for the researcher to obtain statistics regarding the influx of illegal Bangladeshi immigrants; the researcher, after cross-checking from various sources, has found that the influx of illegal immigrants has actually decreased over the years. According to reports, infiltration of Bangladeshi nationals has decreased as a result of improved border management, which includes greater cooperation with Bangladesh, strengthened fence, and technology-supported patrolling. A senior BSF officer stated that “in the last few years, the infiltration of Bangladeshi nationals has curtailed.”[26] Since 85% of the Indo-Bangladesh border is fenced, and Border Security Forces are constantly patrolling, combined with the use of floodlighting and other surveillance technologies, crossing the Indo-Bangladesh border into India has become extremely difficult.[27] Since 2019, roughly 14,361 Bangladeshi nationals have been stopped at the border, with 4,896 captured while attempting to enter India and 9,233 apprehended when attempting to flee following unlawful stays. This demonstrates a focused effort by the Border Security Force (BSF) to handle illicit crossings properly.[28]

 

Next, coming to the Indo-Myanmar border, the trend of illegal immigration from the Myanmar side is still underway in the Indo-Myanmar border. The political instability in Myanmar, as well as the recent Meitei-Kuki clashes, have led to the increased influx of Myanmar refugees to India, especially in the states of Manipur and Mizoram, due to the porous borders. N. Biren Singh, the Chief Minister of Manipur, has announced that 10,675 illegal immigrants, predominantly Myanmarese, had arrived in the state in the past five years.[29]  There are around 36,000 Myanmarese who have been taking shelter in Mizoram since 2021.[30]

 

2.3.4 Drugs trafficking

Around 90% of smuggled narcotics in India originate in Myanmar and are smuggled into India via a few chosen routes along the porous Indo-Myanmar border.[31] Taking advantage of its poorly controlled border, drugs have been entering Manipur and Mizoram and passing up to Mainland India.  Out of the 46 battalions of the Assam Rifles available, only about 15 battalions are deployed for border guard duty, while the rest are used for counter-insurgency operations.[32] This implies there isn’t sufficient personnel to protect the Indo-Myanmar border, which is 1643 kilometres long. This led to a massive vacuum in border surveillance, which drug traffickers took advantage of. However, it is not possible to obtain statistical data regarding the amount of drugs which have been smuggled through the Indo-Myanmar border. The researcher, after checking from various sources, has found that the incidents of drug trafficking have increased over the last few years. Recent years have seen an increase in drug seizures in India’s northeastern provinces bordering Myanmar. Drugs of US$10.17 million were confiscated in fiscal year 2021-22, with a haul worth US$14.36 million in 2020-21. Between July 2022 and July 2023, the Manipur police confiscated contraband worth around US$193 million. The year 2024 continues to mirror this trend, as seen by drug seizure data from numerous North Eastern Region states.[33]From January to March 2024, the Mizoram Excise and Narcotics Department captured 15 kilogramme of heroin, 96.5 kg of methamphetamine pills, and 238.6 kg of ganja.[34] Due to the ethnic war in Manipur, which began in May 2023, the typical drug trafficking route has been redirected to Mizoram, mostly through the Zokhawthar region. According to Indian Excise and Narcotics police, there has been a rise in the trafficking of methamphetamine tablets or crystal meth, with seizures of 376.764 kg between 2019 and 2022, up from 9.108 kg between 2015 and 2018.[35]

 

 

 

 

  1. Findings and Discussion

 

Research Question: What is the correlation between border management and security threats facing the northeast region?

Answer: The following findings have been obtained by the researcher from the study

  1. Regarding the India-China border, it is very difficult to obtain a correlation between the conventional security threat and the border management effort, as factors like geopolitical rivalry exist between India and China.
  2. A general negative correlation was found between border management efforts and non-traditional security threats in the region. It has been found that the threat is reduced when there is more improvement in the border management effort. The threat will be reduced if the border management effort improves. For example, on the Indo-Bangladesh border, the level of illegal immigration has decreased over time as a result of major improvements in border management. At the same time, insurgent-related incidents are also being decreased in the Indo-Myanmar border as a result of heavy military domination of security personnel along the Indo-Myanmar border. The lack of proper control of the border has resulted in increased trafficking of drugs across the Indo-Myanmar border.

 

  1. Conclusion

Similar to how a campus wall or fence protects our houses, buildings, or institutions, borders operate as a crucial barrier to keep out different elements and things that are deemed detrimental to a nation. A nation’s existence and national security may be in danger if its borders are not adequately guarded, making it vulnerable to high-security threats. Subsequently, most of the problems in the northeast would have been prevented or solved if the Indian government tightened its border control. It has been found that most of the internal problems facing India’s North East region are due to a lack of India’s proper border management. There is an urgent requirement to manage the international border more effectively. Proper border management requires adequate infrastructural support. It needs proper connectivity infrastructure for unrestricted movement of security forces and local people.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[1]Sukrita Barauh. 2024. “226 dead, 1,500 injured, 60,000 displaced and 28 ‘missing’ — one year on, the Manipur toll.” The Indian Express. May 3, 2024. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/manipur-marks-one-year-of-conflict-counting-the-cost-amid-tears-9304527/.

 

 

[2]Das, Pushpita. 2018. “Security Challenges and the Management of the India–Myanmar Border.” Strategic Analysis 42 (6): 578–94. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2018.1557932.

 

 

 

[3]Jamwal, N. S. 2004. “Border management: Dilemma of guarding the India‐Bangladesh border.” Strategic Analysis 28 (1): 5–36. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160408450116.

 

 

[4]Das, Pushpita. 2008. “India–Bangladesh Border Management: A Review of Government’s Response.” Strategic Analysis 32 (3): 367–88. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160802063228.

 

 

[5]Das, Pushpita. 2008. “India–Bangladesh Border Management: A Review of Government’s Response.” Strategic Analysis 32 (3): 367–88. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160802063228.

 

 

[6]Rajesh Deb Barman. 2022. “A STUDY ON BORDER MANAGEMENT AND ITS IMPORTANCE OF SECURITY IN BORDER MANAGEMENT.” Tec Empreserial 5 (2). https://www.researchgate.net/publication/379994140_A_STUDY_ON_BORDER_MANAGEMENT_AND_ITS_IMPORTANCE_OF_SECURITY_IN_BORDER_MANAGEMENT.

 

 

[7]Pushpita Das. 2022. India’s Approach to Border Management. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003365327.

 

 

[8]Nishanth Gowda S. 2020. “BENGAL EASTERN FRONTIER REGULATION (BEFR), 1873: NISHANTH GOWDA S.” ILSIJLM. https://ilsijlm.indianlegalsolution.com/bengal-eastern-frontier-regulation-befr-1873-nishanth-gowda-s/.

 

 

[9]Leake, Elisabeth. 2021. “Where National and International Meet: Borders and Border Regions in Postcolonial India.” The International History Review 44 (4): 856–73. https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2021.1900323.

 

 

[10]M. Maroof Raza. 2020. Contested Lands: India, China and the Boundary Dispute. Westland Publications Private Limited, 2021. https://books.google.co.in/books/about/Contested_Lands.html?id=z0AVzwEACAAJ&redir_esc=y.

 

 

 

[11]  The Geographer, Office of the Geographer, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and Office of Strategic and Functional Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. 1968. “International Boundary Study No. 80 – May 15, 1968 Burma – India Boundary.” https://library.law.fsu.edu/Digital-Collections/LimitsinSeas/pdf/ibs080.pdf.

 

 

[12]Sanjeev Chopra. 2024. “India-Myanmar Share an Imperfect, Complex History. Insurgency, Drug Trade Led to Permit System.” ThePrint. https://theprint.in/opinion/india-myanmar-share-an-imperfect-complex-history-insurgency-drug-trade-led-to-permit-system/1955337/.

 

 

[13]The Economic Times. 2021. “Forgotten Hero Who Brought Tawang Under Indian Union to Be Honoured,” February 13, 2021. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/forgotten-hero-who-brought-tawang-under-indian-union-to-be-honoured/articleshow/80896611.cms?from=mdr.

 

 

[14]Leo E. Rose, and Margaret Welpley Fisher. 1967. The North-East Frontier Agency of India. Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1967. https://books.google.co.in/books/about/The_North_East_Frontier_Agency_of_India.html?id=iLVz_3l6RscC&redir_esc=y.

 

 

 

[15] Kalita, Prabin. 2022. “MHA: 60% of International Borders in North East Porous, This Aids Insurgents.” The Times of India, November 9, 2022. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/guwahati/mha-60-of-internationl-borders-in-north-east-porous-this-aids-insurgents/articleshow/95412293.cms.

 

 

[16] “Construction of Forts [Chapter 3].” 2019. October 20, 2019. https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/kautilya-arthashastra/d/doc365603.html.

 

 

[17]Indiatimes. 2023. “507 Km Roads Made in Arunachal in 3 Years: Know Why BRO Developed Infrastructure in the State,” August 5, 2023. https://www.indiatimes.com/news/india/507-km-roads-made-in-arunachal-in-3-years-know-why-bro-developed-infrastructure-in-the-state-611248.html.

 

 

[18]“The ITBP Claims That It Has Enough Resources to Raise New Battalions.” 2018. May 16, 2018. https://forceindia.net/paramilitary/itbp/ready-to-grow/.

 

 

[19]Wasbir Hussain*. n.d. “Insurgency in India’s Northeast Cross-border Links and Strategic Alliances.” South Asian Terrorism Portal. https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume17/wasbir.htm.

 

 

 

[20]“Border Fencing.” n.d. https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1741906.

 

 

[21]Das, Pushpita. 2021. India’s Approach to Border Management: From Barriers to Bridges. KNOWLEDGE WORLD. KW Publishers Pvt Ltd. https://www.idsa.in/system/files/book/indias-approach-to-border-management.pdf.

 

 

[22] “Annual Report 2022-23.” n.d. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS. https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/AnnualreportEnglish_04102023.pdf.

 

[23]Das, Pushpita. 2016. Illegal Migration From Bangladesh. Book. IDSA Monograph Series. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. http://www.idsa.in.

 

 

[24]BBC News. 2020. “India and Bangladesh: Migration Claims Fact-checked.” February 21, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-51575565.

 

 

[25] “1.4 Lakh Illegal Immigrants Detected In Assam, 30,000 Deported: Minister.” n.d. NDTV. https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/1-4-lakh-illegal-immigrants-detected-in-assam-30-000-deported-minister-2486771.

 

 

[26]The Times of India. 2022. “More Than 14,000 Bangladeshi Nationals Sent Back Since 2019,” April 29, 2022. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/more-than-14000-bangladeshi-nationals-sent-back-since-2019/articleshow/91175804.cms.

 

 

[27]“Annual Report 2022-23.” n.d. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS. https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/AnnualreportEnglish_04102023.pdf.

 

[28]The Times of India. 2022. “More Than 14,000 Bangladeshi Nationals Sent Back Since 2019,” April 29, 2022. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/more-than-14000-bangladeshi-nationals-sent-back-since-2019/articleshow/91175804.cms.

 

 

[29]“Over 10K Illegal Immigrants Detected in Manipur in Last 5 Years: CM Biren Singh.” n.d. MorungExpress. https://morungexpress.com/over-10k-illegal-immigrants-detected-in-manipur-in-last-5-years-cm-biren-singh.

 

 

[30]“Nearly 1,390 Myanmar Refugees Enter Mizoram Amid Renewed Clashes,” May 25, 2024. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/nearly-1390-myanmar-refugees-enter-mizoram-amid-renewed-clashes/articleshow/110413583.cms?from=mdr.

 

[31]“Challenges to India’s National Security: The Illicit Flow of Drugs From Myanmar to India-Pre and Post Myanmar Coup of 2021 – CENJOWS.” 2023. June 8, 2023. https://cenjows.in/challenges-to-indias-national-security-the-illicit-flow-of-drugs-from-myanmar-to-india-pre-and-post-myanmar-coup-of-2021/.

 

 

[32]“Annual Report 2012-2013.” n.d. Ministry of Home Affairs. Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/AnnualReport_12_13.pdf.

 

[33]Sreeparna Banerjee. 2024. “From Poppy Fields to Black Markets: Understanding the Drug Trade Across India and Myanmar.” Observer Research Foundation. 2024. https://www.orfonline.org/public/uploads/posts/pdf/20241003213119.pdf.

 

 

[34]“Manipur ethnic violence giving rise to drug smuggling in Mizoram: Minister.” 2024. Indian Express. 2024. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/manipur-ethnic-violence-drug-smuggling-mizoram-9196938/.

 

 

[35]“Drug Smugglers Find New Route via Mizoram, Evade Clashes-hit Manipur.” 2023. The Hindu. November 11, 2023. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/dawn-of-new-drug-route-from-myanmar-to-india/article67524671.ece.

 

 

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