INDIA’S GROWING SECURITY CONCERNS AMIDST TECTONIC SHIFT IN CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL GEO-POLITICS：THE CHINA FOCUS
- DHRITI ROY
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR AND HEAD
DEPARTMENT OF CHINESE
SCHOOL OF LANGUAGES AND LITERATURE
SIKKIM UNIVERSITY
EMAIL: droy@cus.ac.in
Brief Bio-Note
Dr. Dhriti Roy is currently Associate Professor and Head at the Department of Chinese, School of Languages and Literature, Sikkim University (Central University). She received her training in Classical Chinese and Sinological Studies alongside modern Mandarin, Japanese and Tibetan languages. In 2013, Dr. Roy represented India as the best emerging researcher on China Studies during the Second Interdisciplinary Symposium of Emerging Scholars at the India China Institute, New School, New York.In 2014 she was awarded the Mira Sinha-Bhattacharjea Award for the best paper presented by a young scholar under the age of 40 at the 6thAnnual All India Conference of China Studies,for her paper titled, “Chinese Humanist Thought on State and Society – Is There Something to Learn from Ancient Chinese Philosophical Writings for Modern Governments?” organized by the Institute of Chinese Studies(ICS) at the Indian Institute of Management, Kozhikode, 12-14 December 2013. She has over thirty-five publications in UGC CARE and refereed journals to her credit. She has authored eight book chapters. Her recent publications include Roy, Dhriti (2023), “Zhemengxiong as Depicted in Qing Official Documents: Exploring Sikkim’s Cultural and Commercial Ties with Tibet in Light of Qing China’s Perception of the Sub-Himalayan Region” in Alka Acarya edited Boundaries and Borderlands: A Century after the 1914 Simla Convention, Routledge, and Roy, Dhriti (2019), “Continuity, integration or metamorphosis? Retracing the evolution of China’s social structure and cultural identity through history” in Geeta Kochar edited Modern China, Society, Culture and Literature, Routledge. She has three PhD scholars working under her supervision, and one of them, Ms. Sheetal Pradhan has recently been awarded her doctoral degree in May 2024
India’s Growing Security Concerns Amidst Tectonic Shift in Contemporary Global Geo-Politics: The China Focus
ABSTRACT
India and China stand out as two of the world’s most ancient, continuous, living geo-civilizational spaces, rightfully claiming historic bilateral association of over two millennia; an association which had been founded primarily upon profound links of Buddhist interconnectivity, and regular cultural and trade exchanges. However, with India and China’s evolution into modern day nation states, and a contemporaneous tectonic shift in international political reconfigured tendencies, these former day ‘pre-colonial Buddhist brothers’, soon became ‘post-colonial political neighbours’, with much of their Buddhist affinity and strong religious sentiments having gotten dissolved into the dust and dirt of border clashes and skirmishes. Attempts by both countries in recent times to project an otherwise mutually respectful, good neighbourly bilateral relation, have often times been outlined by covert elements of trust deficit and implicit signs of mutual suspicion, wherein issues of serious security concern with regard to China, have been looming over for long within the physical as well as psychological space of India. It therefore becomes imperative for India to identify the crucial possible security challenges posed from the Chinese side in the short and long run, to enable India prepare and counter them better, with greater efficacy.
Key Words: Buddhist affinity, geo-civilizational space, border clashes, trust deficit
Prelude: Introductory Remarks
The year 2025 marks the seventy-fifth anniversary of the founding of diplomatic ties between India and China. Traveling back in space and time, on April 1, 1950, India had been one of the first non-Communist nations in the world to have formally recognized the People’s Republic of China as the legitimate government under the one-party rule of the Communist Party of China (CPC 中国共产党), after the successful takeover of Mainland China by the Communist Revolution under the chairmanship of Chinese Head of State, Chairman Mao Zedong. During the early decades of the 1950s, the Indian and Chinese leaders jointly advocated the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence (Panchsheel和平共处五项原则) as a set of guiding principles determining the trajectory of India-China foreign policy. Since then, India and China have navigated through both calm and rough waters.
With the escape of His Holiness, the 14th Dalai Lama from China-occupied Tibet in 1949 and the arrival of thousands of other Tibetan refugees to India, India-China bilateral relations witnessed the first low of the era. The 1962, large scale armed conflict at the Sino-Indian border of Aksai Chin and North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) further deteriorated ties, quite beyond repair, till the late 1970s. Amidst issues of trust deficit and mutual suspicion, the first ice was broken by the resumption of the exchange of ambassadors between both the countries in 1976, followed by the historic visit of Indian Prime Minister, Shri Rajiv Gandhi to China, leading to high level exchanges between the countries. In June 2003, the visit of Indian Prime Minister Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee to China resulted in the signing of the Declaration on Principles of China-India Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation. An exchange visit in 2005 by Chinese Premier Mr. Wen Jiabao led to the signing of Joint Statement, declaring the establishment of Strategic Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. In November 2006, Chinese Head of State, Mr. Hu Jintao’s state visit to India paved way for the issuance of a Joint Declaration and the formulation of Ten Strategies to deepen strategic cooperative partnership between the two countries. In January 2008, the Indian Prime Minister Shri Manmohan Singh’s visit to China laid the groundwork for the signing of the India-China Joint Vision for the twenty-first century. The year 2011 was declared as the Year of China-India Exchange, while the year 2012 was declared as the Year of China-India Friendship and Cooperation. Since 2013 onwards, both countries vowed to uphold mutual cooperation, communication and coordination through their presence and engagement in international organizations such as the United Nations Organization, BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China-Russia-India mechanisms in the domains of climate change, food and energy security, reform of international financial institutions and global governance.
However, that which is strikingly shocking here is that despite the abovementioned line of progress in India-China bilateral relations and apparent concerted efforts from both sides, India and China did get engaged in the Sino-Indian border scuffle at Doklam in 2017, and in Sino-Indian border skirmishes at Galwan between 2020-2021.
At this point, it cannot,therefore,be denied that the bilateral peace process and the mutual prosperityseeking mechanism did fail to deliver the expected outcome of promoting peace and prosperity. The collapse of the building bricks of mutual cooperation, accompanied by a rise in mutual suspicion about each other’s intention, probably then opens up fresh avenues of investigation.
The discussion in the following few sections attempt to bring to light those very initiatives or plans undertaken by the Chinese government in recent years, which despite seeming to be nascent or benign, carry ominous signs of serious security concerns, either for the near or for the distant future, not just in the context of India but also globally.
Interlude: Discussion on Issues of Concern
China’s Infrastructural Development and Innovative Military Preparedness
As per detailed study conducted through the extensive use of high-resolution satellite images,international relation experts have now drawn attention to China’s rapid construction drive of heliports and airbases as an innovative strategy of high-altitude combat mechanism. In this context, the following section here shall discuss China’s substantial investments in the Western Theatre Command, in the recent years, and how this new game plan of China might pose a security threat to India. The term ‘theatre’ here refers to a performing zone for the Chinese armed forces
The Western Theatre Command, one of the five major theatre commands within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), includes the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and takes into its arena, some of the most complex and inhospitable terrains, and extremely harsh climatic conditions. The WTC includes deserts and high mountains, long borders and challenging social conditions. With the headquarters of the Western Theatre Command located in Chengdu, the said command shoulders the major responsibility of safeguarding China’s frontiers and borders with India and Russia. The Western Theatre Command also leads the task of upholding operational responsibility for the Sino-Indian border. The WTC theatre missions include the maintenance of internal stability with restive Tibet and Xinjiang regions, while simultaneously supporting the People’s Armed Police Force stationed there[1].
While its internal (domestic) obligation includes disaster relief and rescue operation missions in close alliance with regional civilian organizations, its external (foreign) assignment includes its possible response, if required, for anyunforeseen unrest in Central Asia under reorientation or shift in the policies of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or any unprecedented move by any of its member states.
As per recent findings based upon open-source information, there has reportedly been anupsurge in infrastructure development activities by China in the WTC since 2017, with cases of both new constructions, as well as extensive upgradation of thirty-seven airports and heliports. Most of these airbases and heliports are technologically highly advanced and well equipped, and cater to both civilian and military aviation purposes, mostly in Tibet and Xinjiang. The issue that raises caution here is the unprecedented pace at which the construction drive is being implemented and the cutting-edge technology which is being employed in its effective execution. Especially since the confrontation between China and India in 2017 and then in 2022, there has been a discernible presence of China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) in the strategic location of Tibet and Xinjiang. This seemingly long-term, strategic game plan of China not only justifies its move to weave in the far-flung regions into its central and coastal well-knit connectivity network, as might, on the very first occasion, often apparently seem to be, but instead furthermore, implicitly speaks volumes about China’s possible long-term military presence in the region.
A comprehensive analytical study about the Western Theatre Command (WTC), and a nuanced observation of the context behind its setting up and its sole objectives shall enable us to derive a logical conclusion about China’s political vision behind this project.
The Western Theatre Command is the largest and the most expansive of the new theatres with complex internal and external operational mechanism associated with it. The theatre is commanded by Army General Zhao Zongqi, former commander of the Jinan Military Region (2012-2016). General Zhao Zongqi had been a natural choice for the Chinese Military Commission and the Communist Party of China, given the fact that he has been a senior military official and had participated in combat with Vietnam. General Zhao Zongqi with his operational knowledge on mountain warfare, having served as Commander of the 52nd Mountain Brigade in the early 1990s and as Commander of the 14th Group Army (2005-2008) therefore remainedan undisputed choice for the PRC government[2].
The Western Theatre Command’s primary strategic line of action remains focused upon India and its contested border regions with China (Xinhua News Agency, August 18, 2014, China Military Online, March 3, 2016).
In a recent development, the Chinese press has shared information that the Tibet Military Command/Tibet Military District within the Western Theatre Command (WTC) has been elevated by one level for direct placement under the PLA army, much in contrast to the other provincial level military districts which are under the national Defence Mobilization Department of the Central Military Commission. It is important to note here that as per an article in the Global Times, the Tibet Military Command has been provided the prime responsibility of carrying out operations against India, especially in the Arunachal Pradesh area. Advanced training is also reportedly being provided to forces to equip them substantially with high-altitude mountain combat skills, warfare techniques and long-range mobility for such a contingency[3].
While China asserts that the latest infrastructural development initiatives are part of a broader and more holistic socio-economic program for sustainableregional progress, marked by large scale investment in agriculture, sustainable energy resources and recreational amenities, the geographical proximity of the large-scale infrastructure development projects to the India-China Line of Actual Control, raises serious security concerns about a predicament, looming in the near future.
In fact, close to the Doklam and the Arunachal regions, China hasalready constructed five operational air bases, these are namely the Shigatse Peace Airport, the Lhasa Gonggan Airport, the NyingchiMainling Airport as operational dual-use airports, and theDamxung Airport and the ShigatseTingri Airport as construction airbases. The Shigatse Peace Airport is located ata distance of 154 kilometres from the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and is positioned in a straight line leading directly to the Doklam region. It is situated at an altitude of 3,800 metres above the sea level and is close to the YarlungTsangpo River, a significant waterway that flows through Tibet and serves as the region’s lifeline.
The Lhasa Gonggao Airport has in recent times emerged as the foremost aviation hub in the Tibet region with impressive capabilities. The said airport ensures five hundred and thirty-four weekly flights, connecting twenty-nine prominent airports across China. The chief issue of concern is the strategic location of Lhasa Gonggao Airport, situated about one hundred and forty kilometres from the border of Bhutan and from about two hundred and ten kilometres from India’s Arunachal Pradesh, Tawang Airforce Station. The other prominent airbase at Tibet, serving both civilian and military purposes, is the Nyingchi (Ningxi) Mainling airbase. This airforce station stands in closest proximity to the Indian territory, located merely at a distance of only thirteen kilometres from the border of Arunachal Pradesh and sixty-five kilometres from India’s Advanced Landing Ground in Tuting in Arunachal Pradesh.
The Western Theatre Command stands out as a training ground for some of China’s most sophisticated, advanced offensive and defensive exercises which include the stride (kuayue跨越), joint action (lianhexingdong联合行动) and firepower (huoli火力).
China’s Growing Complacency and Inertness Towards Border Dispute Resolution
China watchers and analysts, have time and again,drawn caution to China’s growing disinterest and lack of genuine efforts towards resolving the long-time unsettled border disputes with India. This comes as a surprise, given the fact that a series of regular high-level meetings have already been conducted between the military delegation of China and India, and yet unlike other border disputes, like those between China and Russia or China and Vietnam,still remains far from being amicably resolved[4].
With recent disengagement of Indian and Chinese troops in the eastern Ladakh sector, bureaucrats foresee a reasonably calibrated approach by both sides in improving bilateral ties. But the continued military deployment in abnormally high numbers to be continuing for the fifth successive year cannot be seen as a sign of solace either[5].
With regard to its standpoint on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the government of India has maintained reticence on the subject of de-escalation, de-militarization and de-mobilization. Troops reportedly remain on active duty at close quarters to the six points of tension, along the border in Galwan, Depsang Bulge, Charding Nala (Nullah), Gogra Post and Hot Springs on the Northern bank of Pangong Lake. Due to absence of authentic information and confirmed reports on whether the People’s Liberation Army troops have retreated to their bases, it cannot be conclusively stated that normalcy has been restored at the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
While India claims that China has been violating several of the agreements and protocols that had been signed between the two sides, without the exercise of patrolling rights the same cannot be authenticated[6] (Godbole, 22 February 2025).
As per the content of the special briefing by India’s Foreign Secretary, Shri Vikram Misri on Hon’ble Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi’s visit to Kazan at the invitation of Russian President Vladimir Putin to attend the 16th BRICS Summit on 21 October 2024, there were clear possibilities and also provision laid down for bilateral meetings to be held on the sidelines between the Indian and the Chinese Heads of States. Shri Misri reiterated that during the previous few weeks, both Indian and Chinese diplomatic and military negotiators had been in close contact with each other in a variety of forums. As a result of the aforementioned initiatives by both sides, Shri Misri informed that agreements had been reached on patrolling arrangements along the LAC in the India-China border areas, leading to disengagement and a resolution of the issues that had arisen in these areas in 2020. The Chinese side, on the other hand, reiterated that India must continue to get over the incidents of 2020, rather than holding on to them, and not let the border standoff serve as a hindrance in the path of social, political and economic bilateral engagement.
China’s Expansionist Policy
China’s Belt and Road Initiative
China has recently formulated a series of socio-political and economic policies with the intention of expanding its sphere of influence (physical, cultural and economic) beyond its territorial limits into regions far and wide. This recently devised strategy, almost about a decade old, ensures China’s full-fledged engagement in massive infrastructure development projects through its large-scale economic investment plans.
In the year 2013, Chinese Head of State, President Xi Jinping proposed the building of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, referred together as the Belt and Road Initiative. Calling this initiative as mutually reinforcing, President Xi Jinping emphasized upon the urgent need to ensure connectivity from one end of East Asia right up to the heart of Europe, in order to fulfil the mission and vision of reviving the ancient Silk Road and bringing back the lost glory of China, a fantastic and ambitious project indeed in itself.Mentioning the BRI as part of China’s foreign policy, President Xi Jinping underscored that the Belt and Road Initiative represents a joint undertaking by China and its Asian neighbours, whereby overland and overseas economic corridors would eventually be constructed in order to connect lands and her people across one hundred and fifty countries in Asia, Africa and Europe[7]. While this China-led massive infrastructure project aims at stretching to some of the furthest corners of the globe, analysts do see this as a disturbing expansionist tendency on the part of China[8]. Some skepticseven raise alarm about the BRI initiative as being a debt trap for borrowing governments[9]. It has also been brought to notice by critics that the investment plan and loan repayment policy floated by the Chinese government lacks transparency, eventually leading defaulter recipient countries to struggle with debt crisis, and finally having to lease out their territories, only for China to ensure its long-term military presence there. Supporters of the BRI project however, blame poorly conceived political-economy dynamics and governance problems on both sides, alongside China’s fragmented and poorly coordinated development financing system as being responsible for the negative social, political, economic and environmental consequences.
China’s Hegemonic Presence in the Indian Ocean Region
China is making its hegemonic presence felt strongly in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) through its trade, energy dependence, dual-use port connection, massive surveillance, arms sale and power projection (Kondapalli, 29 December 2024). The root of this grand strategy of China lies embedded in the 18th Communist Party Congress, held back in the year 2012, in which a resolution was passed to transform China into a strong maritime nation (power). Interestingly, despite not officially being an Indian Ocean Region State, China has showcased plans to step up its activities in the region by initiating a new drive, under its self-created terminology, “China-Indian Ocean Region”, of building a maritime community with a shared future. China has now emerged as a major trading partner for thirty-eight Indian Ocean states[10]. Since 2013, since the time of the revival of the maritime Silk Road initiative, China has established a naval support base at Djibouti with twenty-four ports under which already nine have been constructed, and another five maritime outports belong to the Indian Ocean Region. Out of these, China has already acquired its rights over the ninetynine-year leased port of Kyaukphyuin Myanmar which directly connects its oil and gas pipeline with Yunnan, the ninety-nine-year leased Hambantota and Colombo Port Terminal in Sri Lanka and the forty-five-year leased Gwadar port in Pakistan. To seal the deal till date, there is also Chinese naval presence at Payra and Chittagong in Bangladesh and Darwin in Australia.
Reports claim that China’s military prowess has risen to an unprecedented scale since the coming to power of Chinese President Xi Jinping, with special focus having been placed upon the modernization of Chinese navy. China’s navy takes pride in being the largest in the world with a total of three hundred and seventy vessels and a projected ambitious increase to a four hundred and thirty-five vessels by the year 2030. India, on the other hand is currently in possession of one hundred and thirty-two naval vessels with an expected rise to about one hundred and seventy-five by 2030.
China’s presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is also critiqued on grounds of its well testified illegal activities. Since 2008, China has dispatched about forty-six naval contingents to the Indian Ocean, out of which some have reportedly conducted amphibious operations and air defence exercises, which have failed to prove relevance towards Chinese claims of counter-piracy operations in the Somali coast, thus raising issues of severe violations of UN Security Council commitments. Deployment of eight to ten warships in the Indian Ocean Region, in addition to spy vessels, illegal fishing vessels, use of unmanned under-water drones to map the ocean floor are all reflective of China’s complicated maritime strategies[11] (Kondapalli, 29 December 2024).
China’s Historiographic and Cartographic Tradition in Justifying Territorial Claims
China perhaps is one of the very few nations of the world which has meticulously maintained and preserved ancient historiographic and cartographic records since times as ancient as the Warring States Period (475-221 BCE). This historic tradition of recording with utmost precision detailed accounts of the lands in the frontier regions, including the topography, flora, fauna, culture, economy, military might and indigenous belief systems, have time and again been optimally utilized by the PRC in legitimizing its claims over disputed territories. China’s aforementioned strategy has applied in its justification of Tibet’s annexation in 1951 by producing historiographic records from the Yuan dynasty (1271-1368 C.E.) and cartographic evidences from the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) C.E.), testifying to an always prevalent vassal or tributary status of Tibet, serving as a Protectorate kingdom under Chinese dynastic history. A similar claim has been in circulation and propagation by the PRC in relation to the disputed Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) in the East China Sea, lying east of China, northeast of Taiwan and west of Okinawa Island, presently administered by Japan, after the discovery of oil reserves there. China formally declares its claims over the said island territory, citing records of it having been discovered by the Chinese Ming Dynasty Admiral and explorer Zheng He (1371-1433), refuting Japan’s claims over it after the defeat of China in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, and further US justification of its occupation in 1945.
In one such recent move by China in March 2024, it was reported that the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Mr. Liu Jian reiterated China’s claim on the Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh in response to the Hon’ble Minister of External Affairs for India, Shri Jaishankar’s assertions declaring the frontier state of India as “natural part of India.” Mr. Lin further stated that the border between India and China had never been settled and that Zang nan藏南, China’s official name for Arunachal Pradesh had always been part of China, before having been “illegally” occupied by India, and that China had all along maintained an effective administration over the region. Mr. Liu Jian further underscored that it is an “indisputable fact” that India has established the “so-called Arunachal Pradesh” in 1987 on the illegally occupied territory. India on the other hand has dismissed Beijing’s claim on this issue, calling it “absurd” and “ludicrous”[12].
In another recent reportage, China has asserted once again its long-standinglegitimate territorial claim over Aksai Chin, the high-altitude plateau which had been brought under China’s control after the Sino-Indian War of 1962 and is claimed by India as being a part of Ladakh. While China has for long, since the past several years, been trying to buttress its claims over the said region, this latest one arrives at a crucial point in time, just ten days after the Special Representatives of the Two Nations started to rework on the task of boundary negotiation, after almost a stop gap of five years. New Delhi has raised serious concern and has claimed that China, as part of its recent move, has created two new counties on its political map, including one which is seen encompassing a large part of India’s territory which it illegally occupied in Aksai Chin. India continues to condemn this move of China[13].
While speaking on issues of security, vulnerabilities and regional geopolitics, analysts and foreign policy experts have drawn caution to the fact that there are certain newly emerging vulnerable sites, close to the inter-state border areas within the Indian territory, which need to be highlighted as regions of high sensitivity and vulnerability, and need to be put under strict vigilance. One such region is the Siliguri Corridor, which in expert opinion needs to be treated as a zone of utmost strategic importance, owing to the fact that it easily is connected with two of India’s international neighbours, Bangladesh and Nepal and is also a crucial access point to India’s northeastern states.
Critical Observations and Findings
From the above discussion, the following critical observations emerge;
First, that China in recent years has not only stepped up its military presence all along the border regions which its shares with India, but has focused its goal upon strengthening its combat capabilities on both land and air at high altitudes and inhospitable terrains through all possible technologically advanced mechanisms.
Second, that the construction and full-scale employment of dual-purpose airbases (civilian and military),as well as China’s long-term engagement inthose strategic locations close to India’s territory, leads to a high-end probability of China to engage in surveillance through aircrafts and drones.
Third, that China has created an exclusive mechanism to intertwine military engagement with economic strategic goals, thus enabling it to disguise its original political intentions behind its self-proposed projects of shared world community interests.
Fourth, that Chinatactfully continues to utilize ancient historiographic information and cartographic data to its benefit,and strategically attempts to legitimize its territorial claims over disputed lands and controversial zones.
Given the above state of current affairs, the Indian side could devise the following antidote;
First, that India needs to strengthen its military preparedness on high altitude and difficult terrains, with special focus on modernizing its air force capabilities to one of the highest levels possible, with the introduction of high end technologically advanced equipment, modern aircraft carriers, advanced jets, state of the art weapons and unmanned aircrafts. It should also continue to acquire advanced communication satellites and boost its space reconnaissance capabilities.
Second, upon acknowledging the fact that the Indian Ocean Regionis crucial to India’s maritime security, India needs to adopt a comprehensive, well devised strategy to protect its maritime interests in the Indian Ocean Region. Being a major economic player in the region with high exports and imports, India needs to focus upon building strategic partnerships with other countries and ensure the continued expansion of its trade activities in the region. Alongside, with cooperation from other countries, India needs to counterbalance the hegemonic activities of China. Like the Indian Navy which has always prioritized the Indian Ocean as a region of strategic importance and an important theatre, the Indian leadership also needs to offer equal attention to its maritime policy. Since the Indian Ocean also stands out as an important trading route, not only for the energy vessels for nations which lie outside of the region, but also as India’s prominent maritime trading line for the export and import of energy resources, the region demands a safe, secure, stable corridor to be in place[14] (Baruah, 12 May 2022). The setting up of the new Indian Ocean Division by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs in 2016, and the formulation of a new Indian Ocean Policy by the Prime Minister’s Office under the acronym SAGAR, envisioning the concept of ‘Security and Growth for All in The Region’ is commendable and lays the foundation for a long-term pragmatic and futuristic maritime policy.
Third, that India needs to step up its vigil not only in the already declared conflict-ridden zones, but also in areas which are emerging as vulnerable sites, such as the Siliguri Chicken-neck corridor as a direct corridor to India’s northeast. Further, India should promote with greater vigour the implementation of its Act East Policy and build world-class infrastructure in the region.
Fourth, that India should pay adequate attention towards maintaining historical records in relation to the history of contentious zones and also promote the intensive study of Classical Chinese language in view of creating a circle of researchers and Chinese experts in India who could decipher Chinese historical records with utmost precision to challenge the claims put forth by China.
Fifth, with a discernible paradigm shift in global political trends, marked by rising unrest in Bangladesh and the ousting of Sheikh Hasina as Prime Minister, United States presidential win for Mr. Donald Trump and the return of the Republicans to the White House, the assuming of office by Sir Keir Rodney Starmer as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the current Israel-Hamas conflict and the Russia-Ukraine War calls for a ‘wait and watch approach’, with committed focus upon priorities, rather than a hasty step towards realignment and reconfiguration in India’s foreign policy.
Postlude: Future Possibilities and Proposition for India’s Tactical Engagement
During the recent visit of Indian Foreign Secretary, Shri Vikram Misri to China between 26-27 January 2025, as part of the Vice-Foreign Minister and Foreign Secretary meeting mechanism, Shri Misri met Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Mr. Sun Weidong. Both sides reviewed the present state of India-China bilateral relations and reached a consensus to adopt people-centric measures, including think-tank and media exchanges in order to rejuvenate bilateral ties. The resumption of Kailash Mansarovar Yatra in the summer of 2025 and the sharing of hydrological date and advancing trans-border river cooperation remained current highlights of the bilateral meet.
Indian Foreign Secretary also met the Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, concurrently the Director of the Office of Central Commission of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Minister, Mr. Wang Yi, and Minister of the International Department of the Communist Party of China, Mr. Liu Jianchao. Both sidesacknowledged that the year 2025, being the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and China, should be commemorated along the vision to improve upon public diplomacy efforts,in order to create better awareness about each other, and to restore mutual trust and confidence among the common masses of both the countries. Both sides also agreed to conduct a number of commemorative activities to underscore the significance of this year 2025 by adopting measures for the improvement and development of India-China bilateral relations.Active interactions at all levels of bilateral and multilateral negotiations were encouraged and the objective to strengthen strategic communication, and enhance mutual political trust was underscored.
The gesture appears warm and friendly, and supposedly with no covert political intentions, nor hidden agenda. Yet, it is always advisable to take lessons from history. If the “Hindi-Cheeni Bhai Bhai” fervour could get exhumed in the fumes of the India-China 1962 Border war, and if Joint Statements and Declarations of bilateral strategic partnership could fail to restrain troops from engaging in armed conflicts in Doklam and Galwan in 2017 and 2020 respectively, then the pragmatic approach from the Indian side would be to ‘hope for the best, and yet, be prepared for the worst’.
Track 2 diplomacy, people centric interaction, intellectual and cultural exchange could all prove to be excellent drivers for trust building initiatives, facilitating open and candid dialogues and conversations between different stakeholders from various walks of life from both countries, and helping in breaking the ice and aiding in diplomatic negotiations, and even, perhaps, in dispute resolution, but it would be equally prudent to acknowledge that Chinese society is far from being an open society, with limited or no freedom of speech and action. The question would then be,as to whether the Chinese citizens engaging in such Track 2 and Track 3 diplomatic activities, would do so on their own accord or as part of their unconditional allegiance to the Communist Party of China (CPC) and by virtue of their strong sense of nationalism and patriotism. Would then the critical mass of China not be well trained negotiators on behalf of their own government, and would not also such an initiative from the standpoint of Chinabe one of their many pre-arranged or pre-orchestrated game plan. India needs to deliberate deeply.
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[1]Y. Nithyanandam, “Rapid Military Infrastructure Expansion in Tibet, A Satellite Imagery Analysis,” Takhashila Geospatial Bulletin, September 30, 2023.
[2]Xinhua News Agency, February 1, 2016.
SeeBeijing News, February 2, 2016
Also see, China Military Online, March 3, 2016.
[3]Global Times, May 13, 2016.
[4]China Military Online, November 22, 2016.
[5]Ashok K Kantha, “A Calibrated Approach to Bettering India-China Ties,” Hindustan Times, January 04, 2025.
[6]Avinash Godbole, “The Long and Winding Road of India-China Relations,” The Hindu, February 21, 2025.
[7]Xi Jinping, “Promote the Belt and Road Initiative, Extend Reform and Development,” in The Governance of China II, Foreign Languages Press: Beijing, April 29, 2016. Also see, Xi Jinping, “The Belt and Road Initiative Benefits the People,” in The Governance of China II, Foreign Languages Press: Beijing, August 17, 2016.
[8]Xi Jinping, “The Belt and Road Initiative and Connectivity Are Mutually Reinforcing,” in The Governance of China II, Foreign Languages Press: Beijing, November 8, 2014.
[9]Mcbride, James, Noah Berman and Andrew Chatzky, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative,” in Council on Foreign Relations,February 2, 2023. Also see, Lee Jones and Shahar Hameiri “Debunking the Myth of Debt-Trap Diplomacy, How Recipient Countries Shape China’s Belt and Road Initiative”, Research Paper, The Royal Institute of International Affairs,August 2020.
[10]Srikanth Kondapalli. “Bracing for a Chinese Storm in the Indian Ocean,” in Deccan Herald, December 29, 2024.
[11]Srikanth Kondapalli, “Bracing for a Chinese Storm in the Indian Ocean,” in Deccan Herald, 29 December, 2024.
[12]The Hindu, 25 March, 2024.
[13]Deccan Herald, 29 December, 2024.
[14]Darshana M. Baruah, “Maritime Competition in the Indian Ocean”, in The U.S.-China Economic and Security Commission Review, May 12, 2022.