3 Lovelock Lane , Kolkata

CENTRE FOR EASTERN AND NORTH EASTERN RESEARCH STUDIES – KOLKATA (CENERS – K) CONCEPT NOTE

 

CENTRE FOR EASTERN AND NORTH EASTERN RESEARCH STUDIES – KOLKATA (CENERS – K)

CONCEPT NOTE 

HYBRID  SEMINAR PART 2 & 3 FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY ISSUES

 

  1. Indo – China relations became troubled after the annexation of Tibet by China in early 50s and further aggravated by the annexation of Aksai Chin in 1962. A number of meetings since then have not been able to resolve what was the erstwhile Indo- Tibet border. The Chinese did not adhere to the 1914 tripartite agreement at Shimla, and further exacerbated the border issue by insisting on their 1959 demand line, which not only does not adhere to the Macmohan/Johnson lines, but also shows large tracts of Indian territory from Ladakh to Lohit as Chinese territory. Tibet as a nation was lost to the World, with HH Dalai Lama taking refuge in India alongwith Tibetan Govt in exile.
  2.  India unfortunately agreed to Chinese Suzerainty over Tibet, supported ‘One China Policy’ by not recognizing Taiwan.China has not reciprocated India’s gestures and colloborated with Pakistan for the construction of CPEC through POK. China’s support to Pakistan and Pakistan based terror groups against India, its pro Jihadi stand in UNSC, clandestinely arming of Pakistan with strategic weapon technologies, stymie the growth of India as another ‘Pole’ in Asia,  denial of India a berth on the UNSC, and the recent skirmishes in Doklam, Sikkim, Eastern Ladakh/Ladakh and Arunachal indicate protracted future riven with conflict.
  3.  China has browbeaten almost all neighbours, into border agreements, except for India.  China’s adverse reaction to the West’s support to Taiwan/ the QUAD, its support to Russia in the Russo-Ukraine conflict, is perceived as a step to  rapid ascendancy as the numero ‘UNO’ world power.
  4.   Whereas there is much scope for good relations between India & China, the latter has always considered India as a weaker and thus unequal power, little realising that if China is to become the leading power it has to maintain a workable relationship with India.
  5.   Chinese belligerence & aggressiveness in South China Sea, East China Sea, the LAC/Eastern LAC in Ladakh; UP/Tibet, HP/Tibet border sectors has put China in a confrontation with most neighbours. Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, Arunachal are being forced to settle contested & illegitimate territorial claims of China.  Disputes over the Chinese damming and thinking of diverting Ganga and Brahmaputra River waters in Tibet, have also complicated relations in spite of the surge in Sino Indian trade. China has also resorted to weaponising trade practices, alienating many nations.
  6. China is being accused of purposely spreading the COVID virus to gain world supremacy. There is unprecedented angst in the world against China’s culpability for destroying the world economy & livelihood of people.
  7. China’s prestigious BRI project has not taken the trajectory it was supposed to, and many nations are either opting out or getting further indebted to China. On the other hand, India’s rapid infrastructure development in border areas/LAC, its abbrogation of Article 370, 35A and aggressive statements by her Home Minister to retake Aksai Chin and POK/NAs are considered to be threats to the Chinese CPEC, Highway 219 to Singkiang and Chinese economic interests in the region are being perceived as reasons for Chinese premptive actions.
  8. ​The above issues have been further compounded by a perception that India is joining hands with the US, Japan, Australia, Vietnam, Philipines and South East Asia in a perceived strategic alliance against China – this perception started with the Indo – US Nuclear deal and strategic partnership. The issue of India now Acting East, now being part of the ‘Quad’ to police the South China Sea and becoming a trade and rare earth resources and economic competitor as discussed in Part 1, have added fuel to the fire and according to some Chinese commentators made it necessary to “Teach India a Lesson”
  9. 9.    A full-fledged conflict is unlikely since it would be a ’lose- lose’ situation for both & China’s aspiration to be an world power will be jeopardised. A localised border conflict however cannot be ruled out. India has sent a message by confronting Chinese aggression & expansionism even if it results a conflict.US Intelligence has also recently predicted a Indo-China War.
  10.  As a long term strategy to deter China, India needs to build multi-domain capabilities. These would necessitate enhancement of CNP for strategic autonomy, building strong diplomatic & economic relations with powerful nations but prepare to fight alone, any direct assistance from other nations in a conflict would be a bonus & is not to be planned for. Indian Armed Forces also needs to modernize and change her strategy and war fighting modus operandi in light of the new patterns seen in the Russo – Ukraine, the Israeli Hamas, Balkans Wars and the changes in Chinese war fighting concepts
  11. What therefore are India’s options to “Restore the Status Quo” and to prevent the blatant Chinese acts of aggression in all fields? These issues will be discussed in two parts as a hybrid seminar as follows

 

Part 2 – Foreign and Internal Domestic Policies on 25 May 2024 – 10AM to 1PM

Prof Srikanth Kondapalli – Moderator– and Indo China Relations – measures to improve them Amb Gautam Bambawale(Retd) – Indo China Relations

Professor Thomas, Tezpur University – views of NER on Indo China relations

Professor Das from Silchar University – India’s Act East Policy

Amb Gautam Mukhopadhyaya (Retd) – China s relations with  Myanmar and ASEAN & effect on India

Amb Shiv Mukherjee China’s  relations with Nepal, Bhutan and effect on India

Amb S Chakravarti – China’s relations with Bangladesh and Indian Ocean countries – effect on India

Subir Bhowmick –how do we improve relations with China and resolve our differences

 

Part 2 – Security Aspects- of Indo – China relations  -2PM – 6 PM

Lt Gen J R Mukherjee (Retd) – opening address incl advising all on recommendations of Part 1 & 2

Maj Gen Arun Roye (Retd), Moderator

Mil Member NSA if available Name from Gen Roye

Former GOC 14 Corps – name from Gen Roye

Lt Gen J R Mukherjee (Retd) –  major changes required in India’s Grand Strat/ Tac concepts wrt China

Brig N Mukherjee – Changes required in treaties and talks with China

Retd Naval Offr to be coopted virtually –Defenceof  Indian Ocean

Maj Gen P K Mullick (Retd) – AI, Mosaic Cyber, Electronic and Info Warfare Aspects

ACM Arup Raha (Retd) – Air and space aspects of security and Valedictory Address

 

All CENERS – K Members: serving offricers from DMA, Army, Air, Naval Headquarters, Headquarters Eastern Command, Eastern Naval and Air Commands as nominated by them; Bureaucrats from MOD, MEA & MHA, selected – retd offrsPart 2 and 3.

 

 

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