tcd 25-REPORT

Report on the hybrid seminar held on 4th march 2025 from 0900 hours to 1330 hours organised by CENERS-K on India’s Security threats and options available in the East and North East Region

Atreyee Mitra

Given the present international scenario this seminar was organised by CENERS-K to discuss the threats and strategic options available to India vis-a- vis its neighbours. The panellists engaged in a very fruitful discussion on China- deliberating on intentions and capabilities of PLA on Sino- Indian border and the implied threat to India due to the construction of a mega dam on the river Yarlung Tsang Po at the great bend. Delving into the threats from Bangladesh after the overthrow of the Sheikh Hasina government by the Islamic radicals, the panellists deliberated on the national security concerns and the threat from rising from Bangladesh for the Indian army in conjunction with the Pakistan –China axis. The expert panellists on Myanmar discussed and emphasised on the impact of the current unrest on India’s security concerns relating to IIG havens. They focussed on India’s Act East projects and the role of massive Chinese investments in Myanmar. Finally they stressed on the most important fact on what could be the impact and result if the four main Rohingiya militia groups comes under the umbrella of the ISI and thereby make further inroads into India. Expert speakers on the Bhutan and Nepal themes discussed about India’s security concerns and major issues relating to different perceptions and an opportunity for China to threaten India through these two neighbours. Discussing about the North East where the state of Manipur is currently in a flux may evolve back into a full scale insurgency and in turn draw other neighbouring North eastern states and how significant is the threat from Islamic jihadi groups in the North East particularly after the regime change in Bangladesh. Finally, the panellists on Air, Naval and Cyber war threats gave a current assessment of the threat from China particularly in the IOR in respect to air and naval capabilities.  They also drew attention of the audience towards Cyber and Information warfare capabilities.         

AVSM, VSM Maj. Gen. Arun Roye gave the welcome address and the key note speech thereby introducing the theme of the seminar. In his opening remarks Major General Roye talked about the new world order which being in a very disorder state becomes tougher for India. Deliberating on the very first country in the neighbourhood –Myanmar, Maj. Gen Roye stated that it is an ideal strategic frontier of India, and, hence, needs to be shaped to be favourably disposed towards India. Myanmar is where India’s and China’s core interest lie. China is ensuring resource acquisition and protection of its investments. China officially backs the military junta, but at the same time covertly supports the ethnic rebel groups; this, clearly demonstrates that regardless of who prevails in Myanmar, China’s influence will remain intact. From India’s perspective, Myanmar is of vital importance for defence and internal security needs, stability and development in the north-eastern region. India is pushing eastward to secure its strategic interests and China is pushing southward as part of its “second ocean strategy. The real battle is for international legitimacy, between the junta and the national unity government’s bid for global recognition. Thus, Myanmar is also a proxy battleground, for both regional and global powers. Hard borders and fencing may not be in India’s interests, as this would not get the support of tribes living on both sides of the border, and by consequence, the concerned border states. Geography too is not favourable to stop the porosity by erection, of a fence. Local tribes are sentimentally attached to the land and the forests. Even if India and Myanmar mutually agree to adjustments, the tribal elders are unlikely to let go their claims over the land which they have been controlling for hundreds of years. The area between the border and Chindwin River is the area that India needs surveillance. Since India does not have the wherewithal, India needs to create and generate resources for this purpose. The entire Myanmar army is presently deployed to fight the rebel forces. Wisdom lies in making Myanmar army a partner in, and accountable for, border management. By contributing in infrastructure development for joint/ integrated check posts, provisioning of light weapons, vehicles and communications to the Myanmar army and road connectivity to border outposts. If Myanmar army is enabled, the Myanmar army will deliver, especially at the local level. Higher hq needs to abstain from local parleys. As such, India must reach out to the rebel groups in consultation with the military junta to extend non-lethal humanitarian aid and help relocate and settle the refugees. By extending non-lethal assistance, India will uphold its regional leadership, counter China’s unchecked influence and reinforce stability along its eastern frontier without direct military involvement. Exploring the current unstable political situation in Bangladesh Maj. Gen. Roye commented that slowly but surely Bangladesh is going the way of radicals. Pakistan along with the JMB has been handed a foothold in Bangladesh on a platter for setting up bases. This is a giveaway of intentions of covert operations in the Siliguri corridor through locally inimical groups and individuals. This activity can also double up as link up facilitator for a Chinese thrust through Bhutan, and even through eastern Nepal- where there is large scale unrest and closing of factories leading to joblessness. India needs to be alert and strict about illegal immigration. India’s response to Bangladesh’s ideological drift and Myanmar’s instability, has led India to work with key global players including the US, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who share concerns about the rise of radical Islamism. By engaging these countries to put pressure on Bangladesh’s radical factions, like the JEI, JMB, Hifazat E Islam, Al Tahrir. Jatiyo Nagarik Party remains to be gauged. The increasing radicalization in Bangladesh would fuel extremism in India’s northeast, West Bengal and Myanmar’s Rakhine state, affecting regional stability. The US appears to be pursuing a strategy that involves establishing controlled regimes in both Myanmar and Bangladesh to further its interests, essentially as a counterbalance to China’s growing influence in the region. This ensures clipping of China’s larger interests as also ensuring that India does not advance too quickly on the global stage. One key component of this strategy appears to foster a pocket of Christian influence that spans parts of Myanmar, particularly in chin state, to include Manipur and Mizoram, extending into the Chittagong hills of Bangladesh, calling the entire region “zo nation”, potentially, creating a significant counterweight to Islamic influence. Militarily, Bangladesh armed forces are well trained, and can create problems for Indian forces, particularly in Siliguri corridor in conjunction with a Chinese thrust. It is however unlikely that a Chinese expeditionary force would be used through Bangladesh territory. India aims to steer Dhaka back towards its secular roots while safeguarding its own security interests. While China plays both sides -India must ensure that it does not lose ground by hesitating to act, either in Myanmar or in Bangladesh. It may be prudent for India to consider leveraging intelligence and covert operations. This approach could mirror tactics employed by Pakistan in Baluchistan and Afghanistan, allowing India, to navigate the geopolitical complexities without overt military engagement. Discussing about Nepal he mentions that India and Nepal have a cordial relationship but which is under strain due to lipulekh border interpretation. Chinese influence in Nepal’s security affairs and Nepal signing up for BRI opens up a backdoor entry into India. China may utilise the territory of Nepal as a corridor to support operations in India. Pakistan too has made deep inroads into Nepal. Examining the Nepalese population Maj. Gen. Roye considers that the original homogeneous Nepalese society has been divided into various segments, with the plains area being dominated by Muslims and Madhesis from India. There is a large Gurkha population in different parts of India, and in southern Bhutan. However, recently Nepal has been put in the grey fatf list due to its economy being in doldrums. There is a section who wants monarchy back, but the majority of the population who have tasted democracy would be loath to have it back. Nepal military and Indian military have had long standing relationship of fraternity and brotherhood. They take orders from the national defence council, of which the army chief is an important member. The Chinese PLA is involved in training some of the elements. The Chinese may be able to coerce Nepal, into letting its territory be used for a possible thrust into India, from Shigatse- Biratnagar/ Kakarbitta- Siliguri, besides providing intelligence support. In view of this scenario military plan in relation to Nepal, if any exists, needs to be updated by India along with strengthening the border vigilance and management to disallow arms, narcotics and human trafficking. Analysing Bhutan as a country he pointed out that the nation is a peaceful, buffer monarchy, with a simple non- violent society, mostly of Buddhist denomination where- Southern Bhutan is mainly populated by Gurkha origin people of Nepal and India. Central Bhutan along the line Samdrup Dzonkhar, Punakha, Thimphu, Paro and Ha Dzong is populated by Bhutanese. Northern Bhutan is sparsely populated, only by migrating graziers of Bhutanese and Tibetan origin. Though Bhutan has many a border issue with China, it is in the process of resolving them by directly on a one to one basis. However though Bhutan is not part of the BRI, China has built roads to the main border check points with Bhutan. Bhutan has consistently indicated their loyalty to India in various manners and Bhutan’s security is of paramount interest to India. But cracks have started appearing in this sphere after the Dokalam incident. In case of a conflict with China, India has no option but to activate its long standing treaty with Bhutan, well in time. Territory of Bhutan cannot be permitted to become a launchpad for the Chinese, into the Siliguri corridor and beyond. The three major routes available to Chinese, through Bhutan are the- Dokalam- Jampheri- Jaldhaka; Dukhey Dzong- Paro- Jaigao; and through Tashi Gong Dzong-Samdrup dzonkhar- into Rangia in Assam. So in that case Maj Gen Roye suggests that the defence treaty with Bhutan, which mainly refers to a deployment only on invitation by Bhutan; is outdated in today’s context needs to be updated if has to become effective. Delving into the North East Region Maj. Gen. Roye considers this region of being of immense strategic significance due to its rich cultural heritage, vast natural resources, blessed with great talents in multiple domains, history of chivalry and sacrifices. However perceived disparities in land ownership and political power have fuelled resentment in Manipur. The core of the crisis lies in ethnic identity, land rights, demographic concerns and governance challenges. With ethnic Zomi rebels taking control of the strategic Kale and Kabaw valleys, it has a direct impact on India’s direct land access to Southeast Asia and hence India’s act east Policy. The Golden Triangle’s narcotics trade is one of the major funding sources in fuelling the instability in Manipur and other parts of northeast. On the other hand, the successful resolution of internal security issues in Mizoram stands as a case study for handling similar conflicts in the region. Influx of Chin refugees into Mizoram, has led to increased vulnerabilities. The rise in call of Zo nationalism essentially to unify Chin, Kuki, Mizo and Zomi communities under a secessionist identity threatens India’s territorial integrity. The signing of accords between rebel groups of Myanmar, in Aizawl, in presence of the Chief Minister, points towards the collaboration between foreign interests. Unfortunately in Nagaland, final peace settlement has still been elusive. Influx of Nagas from Myanmar has only added to the existing problems. The best option as the way forward is through decisive action to curtail foreign influence, fostering ethnic harmony and neutralizing insurgent elements. While concluding Maj. Gen Roye put forth that China’s strategy is to contain in India from all sides. Though China already has Pakistan in full support in the west; if it can have Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Myanmar in the east it would have completed its mission. This in turn would permit China to use the territory of these nations as launch pads or thrust lines into India, in case of an all-out war. The possible thrust lines discussed can be used in conjunction, or singly. The former would be a worst case scenario as China follows the concept of enemy capitulation without the use of force. India needs to quickly find ways and means to make the Siliguri corridor impregnable and / or provide it appropriate and adequate depth and needs to keep Bangladesh out of the equation, in any and all manners, i.e. diplomatically, politically, and even militarily if required.

Lt. Gen. John Ranjan Mukherjee delivered his lecture on India’s security threats in the East and North East Region & strategy needed to handle them and primarily focussing on China aspect. The citizens of this country are deeply concerned about the security threats emerging in the East. While diplomatic talks continue, the PLA has not withdrawn; instead, they have reinforced forward positions and created a Western Theatre Command with formations ready for rapid reinforcement. He clarified that his comments on the PLA are based on publicly available information and open-source intelligence. Currently, two group armies are allotted to the Western Theatre Command, but many more can reinforce them if the Taiwan threat subsides. He pointed that recently the Myanmar military reportedly permitted the PLA to enter Northern Myanmar to protect Chinese assets. Consequently, the PLA Navy is stationed at Kyaukpyu, the PLA Air Force is positioned in Mandalay, and PLA ground forces are spread across Northern Myanmar, safeguarding their interests. This positioning makes Myanmar a potential launchpad for Chinese aggression against India. Meanwhile, Bangladesh’s political instability and suspected involvement of US-backed anti-India elements further complicate the security landscape. Given these developments, India must remain vigilant, adequately fund its defences, and prepare for potential confrontations in the region. The Western Theatre Command has the equivalent of three border defence divisions in a holding role opposite Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and Arunachal Pradesh, extending up to the LAC. It includes the former 13th Group Army, now known as the 77th Group Army, which consists of one armoured division, two motor rifle divisions, and one artillery division. These have been reorganized into twelve to thirteen combined arms brigades, following the new organizational pattern they have adopted. Additionally, the former twenty firsts Group Army, now called the seventy sixth Group Army, is similarly organized into twelve to thirteen combined arms brigades. There is some uncertainty regarding the fourteenth Group Army, which includes one armoured division, one motor rifle division, and one artillery division stationed at Kunming in Yunnan Province. Another unit, the former forty seventh Group Army, now the seventy fifth Group Army, consists of one motor rifle division and one artillery division based at Kunming. While its role is currently unclear, it is likely tasked with assisting the Western Theatre Command in the east, as it is stationed near Chengdu and surrounding areas. The Western Theatre Command Air Force has an estimated two hundred to three hundred aircraft, including J-10 and J-11 fighters, H-6 bombers, and approximately twenty transport aircraft. This includes the thirty sixth Fighter Division, thirty sixth Fighter Ground Attack (FGA) Divisions, and thirty seventh th FGA Division. The Western Theatre Command Navy includes amphibious ships, frigates, and submarines. The PLA Rocket Force is believed to possess about two hundred missiles, possibly more. The PLA Strategic Support Force handles space, cyber, and electronic warfare units. The Western Theatre Command also has an airborne corps of about 10,000 personnel. However, reserve forces are inadequate compared to earlier assessments. Previously, we estimated a threat of 30 to 33 divisions opposite India. Following the reorganization, this number now appears to be around 20 to 22 divisions — albeit modernized and well-equipped. Against Eastern Command, there are approximately 12 to 14 divisions. Regarding reserve formations, there are the 61st, 62nd, and 63rd infantry divisions; the 6th and 8th motor rifle divisions; the 4th and 11th armoured divisions; and the 61st and 62nd artillery divisions. The previously estimated 30 to 35 divisions no longer exist; the total now amounts to roughly 20 to 22 divisions across the entire front. He then raised a crucial point: we often discuss adopting the theatre command structure following the American, Chinese, and Russian models. However, considering the multiple threats India faces — not only in the east but also in the west — can we afford such a structure? Do we have the resources to implement it effectively? Frankly, he doubted that. In his view, pursuing this structure prematurely could prove counterproductive. In addition to the military threat, he also mentions that India faces a significant economic challenge. India’s trade deficit with China is substantial. The flooding of the north-eastern region with Chinese goods, combined with Beijing’s strategic control over essential minerals and rare earth materials, exacerbates the issue. Despite India’s impressive GDP figures, the economic strain is considerable. If India doesn’t address this, then there is a risk of creating a self-inflicted vulnerability. Turning to the nature of war scenarios he explained them in great details as follows. First is the strategy of attrition. India’s current strategy resembles a fortress mind set — focusing on Gangtok, Nathu La, and related defences. However, concentrating troops in fixed positions invites disaster. Our strategy must evolve to embrace precision-guided munitions, drones, and high-tech artillery. The second is the surprise and deception. As an alternative strategy it involves bypassing entrenched positions. For instance, advancing through western Bhutan — bypassing the heavily defended Sikkim region — could isolate enemy formations. Similarly, combining indirect approaches through eastern Nepal could create effective flanking manoeuvres. The third is the holding actions and attrition strategy. In the Subansiri sector, defensive measures combined with offensive raids could disrupt enemy logistics. Drawing from his personal experience, Lt. Gen. Mukherjee shared that during his service he was involved in joint training in Bhutan, operating behind PLA lines. In 1964, he along with his fellow soldiers conducted raids targeting Chinese facilities in the Chumbi Valley, and as such he is very familiar with this terrain. Finally, he mentioned about logistics and infrastructure vulnerability. An extremely dangerous scenario would involve combined drone, artillery, missile, and air strikes targeting India’s logistic hubs. During the 1971 war, Eastern Command stockpiled supplies for twenty- eight days. Yet, by the second day, there were critical shortages. If logistics hubs are attacked in a modern conflict, we risk significant disruption — a serious vulnerability that must be addressed. He concluded, while India’s current defensive strategy relies heavily on attrition, it requires urgent revision. Embracing modern technologies, flexible tactics, and proactive measures is crucial to counter future threats effectively. 

Brig. N S Mukherjee, SM, VSM, the Secretary and Treasurer of the CENERS-K, presented before the audience the various options available to India to counter the threats – firstly, states of facts which are quite evident to state the resent relationship with China. Secondly, resent a scenario before the audience in the time frame given by General Mukherjee leading to major skirmish- leading to full scale war. Thirdly, offer and provide submissions and recommendations to counter the military threat emanating from China and finally, discuss how India should shape its foreign policy to both buy time and prepare for a possible military confrontation. Deliberating on the military preparedness and focussing on the air and naval aspects and cyber and AI threats. Brig. Mukherjee discussed some of the stated facts- the first being -China and India are unlikely to see any third party intervention or mediation to resolve the land border issue. Though china has border disputes with fourteen countries and resolved them except for India, Bhutan and lepcha area of Nepal. Given this stated position of these two countries any resolution with regard to the border issue is an illusion in the near future. It may even take a decade from now. However local skirmishes along the border and LAC is evident from time to time. China would continue to be a belligerent and keep up the border issue alive as its strategic objective is to force India to commit to economic resources towards defence in a disproportionate manner preventing it to becoming a power house and become rival china in its effort to dominate in the Asian continent.  He presented the second scenario at the next round of military confrontation at a bigger scale than the Dokalam stand off or the Galwan clash in the time framed predicted by many think tanks. Coming straight out of hat he went on to discuss the scenario more deeply by mentioning the succession of the fourteenth Dalai Lama which is a contentious issue particularly concerning china’s territorial claims over region like Arunachal Pradesh which it refers to as south Tibet. China has expressed its intension to control the election of the next Dalai Lama potentially nominating a candidate from the Tawang monastery in Arunachal Pradesh to pre-enforce its claim over the area. Now such a move could escalate tensions between India and China as it directly challenges India’s sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh. The region has been a focal point of bitter dispute as China exhorts its historical claims and India maintaining it as an integral part of the territory. The nomination of the Chinese approved Dalai Lama from the Tawang monastery would be perceived as a strategic narrative to assert control over the potential nominated lama to claiming allegiance to china leading to diplomatic and then military confrontation. There have been previous examples of China intervening in the incarnation ceremony. In divide can be reengineered again amongst the Tibetan community led by the present Dalai lama and china can demand India’s sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh in on international forums – china can raise the dramatic announcements – choreograph political actions on grounds and then provoke aggressively  and then move militarily against India . In the interim period china would draw India into a flurry of negotiations and talks while they would carry out a grey zone war fare which is a mix of military, diplomatic, economic and information warfare tactics and gradually achieve strategic objectives without triggering an open war. This would include cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, economic coercions, maritime intrusions and border provocations as it is doing in the LAC. Infrastructure development activities of the PLA are continuing at the multiple levels at LAC. PLA has also focussed on the last mile connectivity. There have been no fundamental shifts in Beijing’s approach towards the standoffs at the LAC endorse despite the flurry of diplomatic meetings and talks. Following his argument Brig. Mukherjee discussed India’s counter strategy to fight china’s grey warfare along with being prepared for a military confrontation. First, India should not fall into the Chinese trap of withdrawing its troop which has been deployed post Galwan crisis. Second, infrastructure development should continue at a rapid space. Third, there is a need to review the peace time deployment of the strike core. Fourth, enhance surveillance system. Fifth, vibrant village programme should continue to engage and develop. Sixth, technological issues should be reviewed. Coming to the last part of his deliberation Brig. Mukherjee delved into the foreign policy orientation towards China. At the outset he mentioned about reorientation the present foreign policy of India where we continue with the engagement and keep a guard and prepare for a war. India’s foreign policy towards China should be guided by a combination of strategic pragmatism, economic resilience and military preparedness given the historical tensions, economic tensions, shifting global dynamics. India’s approach should balance deterrence with engagements. India should deepen military ties with the key allies like the USA, France and Israel for advance technology and information sharing. India should reduce dependence on foreign arms imports and boost self-reliance. Next India should gradually shift critical supply chains from china to other friendly nations while at the same time strengthen domestic manufacture. On the other hand India should continue to implement stricter control over Chinese investments particularly in sensitive sectors. Engage in diplomatic negotiations and maintain stability and avoid miscalculations along the border. India should deepen cooperation with USA, Japan and Australia under the Quad and drop the façade of this organization as being an economic organization by planning and conducting joint air and maritime operations in South Pacific. India should strengthen ties and continue to engage with middle powers and south East Asian countries to counter Chinese influence and establish alternate trade routes. India should also continue engage with BRICS and SCO and the strategic presence in the Indian Ocean should be enhanced. With regard to global engagement Brig. Mukherjee pointed out that there is a subtle requirement of supporting the Tibet and Taiwan diplomatically whereas at the same time leverage global geopolitical trends by capitalizing pro US- China tensions, relationship with Russia has to be balanced.   In essence therefore the mantra that the CENERS-K follows is the five Cs policies which are – coexist, cooperate, collaborate, confront and contest. In his concluding remark he quoted Major General Arun Roye, Vice President, CENERS-K, –“today the fifth pillar of power is technology – the soldiers still remain weapon everything else here are accessories.  How much of a succession technology be at the mountains and jungles is anyone’s guess.”

Veteran Col T.S Sarkar spoke on the topic Implications of dam on the river Yarlung Tsang Po. He introduced to the audience the geographical data and layout of the Brahmaputra river i.e. Yarlung Tsangpo and gave a comprehensive analysis of its origin, path and hydrological characteristics. He then delved into debunking the five myths about the river. The first one being -China’s dams will deplete water downstream; to which he disapproved and pointed out that most of the water comes from rainfall in India and Bangladesh. The second myth was that- the Chinese upstream projects will trap sediments; to which he discussed that most of the sediment transport in the Brahmaputra occurs during the monsoon, mainly within India. Upstream Chinese dams have minimal impact on overall sediment levels. Thirdly he debunked the myth that glacial melt is the primary water source. For this he discussed the role of annual monsoon rains making glacial melt a minor contributor. The fourth myth that he debunked was that China could divert Brahmaputra water northward. For this he discussed that large scale diversion could economically and technically be unfeasible due to extreme elevation differences, high infrastructure costs, and complex terrain. The last one that he debunked was that China’s dams will reduce soil fertility in India & Bangladesh. He disapproved this view by discussing that most fertile sediment originates in India due to monsoon-driven erosion. Chinese dams would not significantly impact soil fertility in downstream regions. Next, he discussed elaborately about the completed, under construction and planned Dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo River. Following that he elaborately discussed about the China’s Yarlung Tsangpo Hydropower & Water Diversion Projects which included China’s ambitious plans on the Yarlung Tsangpo River involving two major projects- The Medog Hydropower Station and a proposed water diversion project aimed at transferring water from the Yarlung Tsangpo to North-western China, particularly Xinjiang. He gave a factual overview about the projects detailing their timeline, technical specifications and executions, structural features, strategic purposes, high risk constructions and environment and ecological concerns. He then talked about India’s concern and Bangladesh’s worries and talked about military implications leading to a discussion on Strategic Infrastructure   Weather Modification as a Tactical Tool, Hydrological Manipulation and Geopolitical Leverage. As for Bangladesh’s worries he discussed about the diplomatic approach and Bangladesh’s worries about reduction in the flow of water which could disrupt agriculture and fisheries. Finally, while discussing about the policy recommendations on securing the Brahmaputra’s future the he discussed about India’s diplomatic and legal measures where he stressed for a push for a legally binding water-sharing treaty with China through UN or World Bank mediation, ensuring a mandatory flood & hydrological data-sharing. Secondly, no unilateral damming or diversions without downstream consultation. Thirdly a joint disaster mitigation effort. However here he also mentioned about the challenge that China resists binding agreements, preferring bilateral negotiations with weaker states. Fourthly, as a mitigation strategy he mentioned about strengthening India-Bangladesh diplomatic alignment and include ASEAN nations affected by China’s Mekong policies. Fifthly, to establish a Brahmaputra River Commission (BRC) with India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal, providing -early warning systems for flood prevention .Sixthly, a collective bargaining front against unilateral Chinese actions. And, finally leverage global forums (UN, G20, BRICS, and ASEAN) to push for multilateral water regulations and apply economic pressure on China. As Infrastructure & Technological Measures, he pointed on the fast-track India’s hydropower projects in Arunachal Pradesh to establish prior water usage rights. Secondly, to develop AI-based flood prediction models and geospatial monitoring for real-time river surveillance. Thirdly, to strengthen India’s Border Roads Organisation (BRO) to enhance- strategic bridges & airstrips near the Brahmaputra basin. Fourthly, to set up military river bases to prevent encroachments. Fifthly, to deploy ISRO & DRDO satellite tracking to monitor- sudden dam releases from China. Sixthly, to keep an eye on the unauthorized diversions of Brahmaputra water and  China’s weather modification programs (e.g., cloud-seeding).As Economic & Trade Leverage, Col. Sarkar stressed on to limit Chinese infrastructure investments in sensitive water projects and encouraged Japanese, EU, and U.S. investments in hydropower & flood control. He further urged to seek help from World Bank & ADB funding for sustainable dam projects in India. From a regional perspective he focused on strengthening Bangladesh’s Water Security thereby to reduce dependency on Brahmaputra water flow, advanced flood control infrastructure, including embankments & reservoirs and AI-driven climate modelling for proactive disaster response. Finally discussing about the Regional Collaboration & Governance, Col. Sarkar, gave importance to establish a Brahmaputra River Commission, modelled after the Mekong River Commission, ensuring- data-sharing agreements with China. He stressed on developing regional expertise in water governance to negotiate effectively with China and strengthen India-Bangladesh diplomatic coordination to present a unified position against China’s unilateral actions. Lastly, he pointed on the joint flood management strategies and sustainable water management initiatives. Concluding this discussion, Col. Sarkar’s final thoughts on the topic was that India and its regional allies must adopt a multi-pronged strategy, combining diplomatic, technological, military, and economic measures to counter China’s unilateral control over the Brahmaputra and ensure long-term water security for the region.

Following Col. Sarkar’s presentation Dr. Prof. Amit Dey, Head of the Department and Asutosh (Chair) Professor of Medieval and Modern Indian History, in the Department of History, University of Calcutta, India. Ph.D. RAC convener both in History, C.U. & IDSK, agreed with him that- China doesn’t engage in strategic battles with other countries like the Europeans or perhaps even the US. Instead, by controlling nature and implementing eco-geographical projects, China attempts to extend its influence globally, particularly in its neighbourhood. Speaking about Bangladesh Prof. Dey pointed out that maybe the Indian intelligence system was not aware of the recent developments unfolding there. The threats posed by the recent developments in the Bangladesh are largely invisible, complex and extremely challenging to encounter. When the socio- cultural fabric of the nation is transformed then that situation can be extremely challenging in the long term. Bangladesh may not pose a military threat to India but socially and culturally Bangladesh can become a hub which could take generations to encounter which could be a challenging part. Bangladesh is a heterogeneous society where still many both educated and uneducated people who are prepared to collaborate with India. But there are some more visible but though a minority, acting in a clandestine way who are ready to radicalise the society- which Prof. Dey termed as institutionalised exclusivism. He delved into the history of undivided Bengal to clarify his debate. He stressed on the fact that we should take advantage of people to people engagement in order to sustain the composite cultural of the Bengalis on both sides. He also mentioned that as Pakistan and China moves closer to Bangladesh they would not leave a stone unturned and take advantage of every situation where the Madrasas would play a vital role and may present them with opportunities to act against Indian interests. Previously, economic crises have historically opened avenues for external influence in Bangladesh. Unfortunately, foreign powers sometimes exploit economic crises to support exclusivist ideologies. During Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s tenure, within three to four years of his coming to power, economic difficulties led to increased investment in Bangladesh’s madrasas by both Iranian (Shia) and Saudi Arabian (Sunni) interests. While madrasas can promote harmony, some institutions may focus on divisive ideologies instead. It is important to recognize that madrasas are not inherently problematic; leaders like Maulana Azad and others were themselves madrasa-educated and worked towards fostering unity. Even Gandhi found inspiration in Sufism and Islamic teachings, highlighting the potential for religious texts to promote human unity rather than division. Through islamization the military tried to legitimize its position as there was no electoral base after the brutal killings of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. This kind of islamization was based on exclusivism and not on composite culture. The army in Bangladesh enjoys certain kinds of immunity much like its Pakistani counterpart, making it difficult to hold them accountable even when linked to controversial actions. Hegemonic orthodoxy is fanatical towards all kinds of cultural activities. To sustain cultural unity, India should develop a long-term strategy, focusing not just on infrastructure (as China does) but also on fostering cultural and social bonds that prevent adversarial forces from exploiting the region. India must focus on strengthening people-to-people ties, institutional partnerships, and regular cultural exchanges. Promoting mystical traditions based on human unity can help counter divisive ideologies. Bangladesh’s shift toward a more hard-line Islamic identity is indeed a growing concern for India. Actions such as lifting the ban on Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh have further complicated the situation. Islamist terror outfits like Ansar Bangla Team have reportedly set up modules in West Bengal and North Bengal, with the potential aim of influencing the ‘chicken’s neck’ corridor — possibly as part of a broader strategy to establish an eastern link to radical networks in India’s northeast. Prof. Dey concluded by saying that India could think to engage with Bangladesh on social- cultural front for a long term basis so that the empty ground is not utilised by potential enemies in the neighbourhood. The Indian Army has historically played a positive role in promoting education, sports, and cultural activities in troubled regions. Similarly, even non-governmental institutions can contribute significantly to building stronger ties with Bangladesh. Annual artist exchanges between the two countries are one such example.

Ambassador Gautam Mukhupadhay, former Indian Ambassador to Myanmar, started with and explained in great details about the course of the war. According to him, there’s a tendency in India to assume that events in Myanmar will follow the same pattern as in 1988, when a pro-democracy agitation was suppressed within two years, allowing the military to regain full control and continue its rule until about 2015. This belief assumes that military force is inherently stronger than popular resistance and that waiting it out will eventually restore military dominance — especially if the military has the backing of powerful nations like China and Russia, alongside global indifference. However, what we are witnessing in Myanmar over the past four years is very different and unprecedented in Asia. This agitation began with peaceful protests — a civil disobedience movement that was deeply Gandhian in character. Remarkably, it was initiated by doctors and teachers — government employees who took to civil disobedience. Armed struggle emerged only after the Myanmar military, known as the Tatmadaw, brutally suppressed these peaceful protests. A key distinction this time is that Myanmar — a country historically marked by ethnic conflicts since its independence — is seeing a new dimension to resistance. Previously, ethnic armed groups remained at odds with the central authority, whether it was democratic or military-led. However, the Bamar heartland — particularly along the Irrawaddy and Chindwin valleys — had largely remained passive except for occasional spontaneous uprisings. In 2021, this pattern shifted dramatically. The predominantly passive Bamar population, previously unarmed, began resisting with rudimentary weapons — essentially the equivalent of sticks, stones, and homemade rifles. Over the past 3-4 years, they have gained control of more than 50%, possibly 60%, of Myanmar’s territory. While this control is mostly in peripheral, hilly, and ethnic areas, there is significant resistance in the Bamar heartland as well. Regions like Sagaing, Magwe, and Mandalay have become centres of resistance. The major turning point came in October 2023 with the formation of the Three Brotherhood Alliance. While this movement is largely pro-democracy, not all rebel factions share this goal. However, they are united in demanding greater decentralization and federalism. He argued that this is Myanmar’s true freedom struggle. In 1948, Myanmar’s independence was largely driven by an elite military cadre that had initially aligned with Japan against the British before switching sides to liberate the country. Unlike India’s independence movement, led by Gandhi and the Congress Party, Myanmar’s independence lacked a comparable mass movement. Consequently, the 1962 coup entrenched military rule, which persisted until 2015 when limited democratic reforms were introduced as part of a seven-stage roadmap for democracy. This plan, designed by General Than Shwe, aimed to maintain military dominance but unexpectedly resulted in the rise of Aung San Suu Kyi as State Counsellor, despite her being barred from the presidency. The current anti-military, pro-democracy, and pro-federal movement is changing Myanmar’s political landscape permanently. Myanmar is unlikely to return to a centralized state. While the Indian security establishment traditionally prefers dealing with a centralized authority, Myanmar’s evolving structure — increasingly fragmented and decentralized — is something India must adapt to. There are concerns about Myanmar’s potential balkanization, which would not be in India’s interest. However, the realistic choice now is not between centralized military rule and chaos; rather, India must find ways to support the pro-democracy movement to ensure a unified Myanmar under a looser, decentralized structure — one that could ultimately align more closely with India. He further noted that, the Arakan Army now controls much of Rakhine State and is advancing into Ayeyarwady, Bago, and even Magwe. The Mu region, home to several defence industries, is particularly vulnerable. Should the Arakan Army establish a stronghold there, Myanmar’s defence production capabilities could be severely affected. In Northern Shan State, most areas are out of the military’s control, with strong Chinese pressure preventing the conflict from spilling deeper into the Irrawaddy Valley. The conflict is already encroaching on Pyin Oo Lwin, home to the Defence Services Academy. Meanwhile, in Chin State, most territory has slipped from military control, with only a narrow corridor north of Tamu to Pansa remaining under the junta’s influence. This region is now a complex battlefield involving not only the military but also various insurgent groups, including those from India’s northeast such as Valley-based groups from Manipur, NSCN-IM, and others. The evolving situation poses a serious security challenge, especially in Manipur and potentially Nagaland. Despite these complexities, he highlighted that Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement is not anti-India. In fact, many in Myanmar see India’s federal democratic model as an inspiration. India’s Ministry of External Affairs recently hosted a seminar with representatives from both Myanmar’s pro-democracy groups and armed factions, positioning India distinctly from China, which has taken a more overtly pro-military stance. China’s recent alignment with the Tatmadaw — partly to control criminal and security issues along its border — may backfire. By openly siding with the military junta, China risks pushing the conflict deeper into Myanmar’s nationalist heartland, which has historically resisted Chinese influence. This is a strategic miscalculation that could further destabilize the region. Russia, meanwhile, has increased its military support for the junta. General Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to Moscow suggests stronger Russian backing. The combined influence of China and Russia, along with perceived U.S. indifference under President Trump, raises questions about whether the momentum of Myanmar’s armed opposition can be reversed. He believes China’s strategic miscalculation — aligning itself too closely with the junta — will ultimately weaken its position. By interfering openly, China risks driving the conflict away from its border and into Myanmar’s core regions, where nationalist sentiment is stronger. Historically, China has never successfully dominated Myanmar, with its last attempt in the 18th century ending in failure. China’s strategic interests in Myanmar are significant — from its Belt and Road Initiative to investments in copper, nickel, hydropower, and the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port. To secure these interests, China has formed a joint security company with the Myanmar military. However, this aggressive stance may alienate segments of Myanmar’s population, giving India an opportunity to present itself as a more favourable alternative through its democratic and federal model. Finally, in conclusion he mentioned that India’s response must be recalibrated. There’s a tendency in India to view Myanmar’s conflict through a communal or religious lens — exaggerating threats from illegal migration or Christian evangelism while underestimating the strategic risks posed by China. Misdiagnosing the problem will lead to misguided solutions. India must recognize that Myanmar’s core struggle is for democracy and federalism, not communal conflict. The lifting of border fencing under the Free Movement Regime (FMR) has also complicated matters. Cross-border tribal connections predate colonial rule and remain vital to India’s influence in the region. By limiting these relationships under overstated fears of illegal migration, India risks isolating itself, while China strengthens its influence. India has the potential to counterbalance China’s presence by engaging meaningfully with Myanmar’s emerging federal structure — leveraging its democratic values to build stronger ties with pro-democracy forces. Failing to act decisively India would risk losing strategic ground to Beijing in a region of vital importance to India’s security and interests.

Admiral Biswajit Dasgupta, Former FOC-IN-C, Eastern Naval Command, spoke on Naval aspects of the China threat and mitigation strategies. He described the chaotic neighbourhood where India stands as a beacon of stability and order which is in no mean measure, a result of the resoluteness, professionalism and dedication of our defence and security forces in managing the troubled neighbourhood. Internal disturbances in Myanmar and Bangladesh coupled with our bilateral issues with China have made our eastern borders restive. China’s overtures towards Bhutan and Nepal also compromise our once strong bonds with these two countries. A chaotic, debt-ridden and corrupt Pakistan will always fall back on its Army to maintain order, which in turn will perpetuate authoritarian rule. In the maritime arena, the Maldives has recently concluded an intelligence gathering agreement with China. This comes close on the heels of repatriating all Indian military personnel from the islands. Sri Lanka, too, has several infrastructure and technological arrangements with China that need to be carefully watched. It is therefore a challenging period for India’s foreign policy. He felt that if India does not develop any elements of its comprehensive national power as they pertain to the maritime world, then India stand to lose the race to China in her own backyard. He shared that an Amrit Kaal is not possible without exponential development of our national maritime power – which is not limited to building a formidable Navy but includes multiple efforts in its ambit. Further, he added in the military realm, there is an urgent need to expedite the Theatre Concept despite whatever reservations individual services may have. The stove-piping of the three services and a lack of a common understanding of joint warfighting will not serve India well in any future conflict. However, in all the conflicts that we have seen in the past, there have been serious problems with jointness and integration. He mentions then, that unfortunately as we all know, ‘Victory is a Poor Teacher’ and we have chosen not to learn lessons jointness that we should have learnt since the 1971 War. He emphasised that our strategies must consider cross-domain effects and influences impacting our strategic objectives. He also felt that our reluctance or perhaps lack of capability to articulate a National Security Strategy does not help in the matter.  He then proceeded to discuss in great depth the Chinese Maritime Security Vision. Discussing the purpose of Chinese Navy Modernisation Adm. Dasgupta pointed out three objectives- first, to bring force to bear on Taiwan  and US-led forces in a crisis; second to enforce their ambitious maritime claims by sheer force and third, to project power beyond their primary areas of interest including the Indian Ocean Region. It is a matter of time before a PLA Navy Carrier Task Force ventures into the IOR. This will be supported by their wide area ocean surveillance satellite network and elaborate intelligence gathering apparatus. There is also a definitive thrust on creating an aerial dominance capability as is evident in Chinese investments in their carrier programme including carrier-borne AEW aircraft, long-range air strike capability, anti-ship ballistic missiles and drone carriers. China has established a military logistics base at Djibouti which is aimed at resupplying their overseas deployments in the IOR and beyond, including their ships on anti-piracy patrol. This base is resupplied by their logistics ships as and when required. The tankers that accompany the combatants on anti-piracy patrol, in turn get resupplied from Djibouti to sustain their task force. As a result, their staying power has been substantially enhanced. This base would certainly be a part of China’s naval operational plans in the Indian Ocean Region in any future situation. China has also invested heavily in the seaports of Hambantota in the southern coast of Sri Lanka and in Gwadar, the westernmost port of Pakistan’s coastline. These ports are strategically located to monitor critical seaborne traffic in these busy shipping lanes. It is a foregone conclusion that China will spare no effort in leveraging their heavy investments to extract concessions from the host nations for their use by PLA Navy ships during any conflict with India. It is little surprise, therefore, that China has been repeatedly attempting to berth their satellite tracking and other ships capable at intelligence-gathering, at Hambantota. SINOPEC commercial tankers, operating out of Hambantota, have been detected and photographed by the Indian Navy while fuelling PLA Navy ships returning from their anti-piracy patrol. This is an indication of the Chinese concept of operations in times of conflict when their logistics would be stretched to sustain their ‘out of area’ forces. While India has taken strong exception to these activities through diplomatic channels citing that they are prejudicial to Indian security interests, how long such diplomatic initiatives prove successful remains to be seen. Interestingly, China is the largest supplier of military hardware to India’s immediate neighbourhood. China’s successful attempt at ousting Indian military personnel from the Maldives has been followed by their bilateral intelligence agreement. China has clearly enticed Maldives with lucrative offers that they find difficult to refuse in exchange for long-term concessions. Apart from supplying almost every kind of naval platform to Pakistan, China has also sold two of its old Ming Class submarines to Bangladesh and developed its submarine base, BNS Sheikh Hasina, at Pekua in Cox’s Bazar.  Myanmar too, has plans to acquire Chinese conventional submarines. Such military supplies will create long-term force level, spares, and maintenance and training dependencies that they could encash in the event of any conflict with India. Adm. Dasgupta also pointed out that China is the biggest perpetrator and beneficiary of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the world’s oceans – and the IOR is no exception. There are huge concentrations of Chinese deep sea fishing vessels and trawlers that routinely plunder the Exclusive Economic Zones of other countries. Their targets are the smaller nations that have poor regulatory mechanisms, corrupt governments and virtually no surveillance or monitoring capability of their own. These fishing vessels in large numbers possess the potential to provide intelligence and conduct operations in the grey zone against Indian interests. On the other hand, Chinese research vessels in the IOR range from oceanographic, seabed and seismic research ships as well as satellite tracking ships. These ships carry advanced radars, sonars, communication fits and remotely operated vessels that could easily be used for gathering intelligence prejudicial to Indian interests. Chinese oil and gas prospecting and exploration drill ships are also present in the IOR where    Chinese firms have occupied the space and will continue to do so in the future because of their diplomatic heft with these countries and heavily competitive pricing in relation to other competitors. This is also true of every other kind of research activity in the oceanic space of the IOR. He mentioned about China’s popular strategy of economic subjugation of small countries. They undertake huge infrastructure projects like ports, airports, government buildings, roads and bridges with material and workforce sources from China. These projects are undertaken by offering long-term loans which the recipient countries can never pay back and subsequent leverages are exercised in the garb of ‘restructuring’ of the loans. Briefly Adm. Dasgupta discussed about China being the ‘father of grey zone warfare’ and has been known to have resorted to several activities such as lasing of Australian maritime patrol aircraft, using its maritime militia to impede passage of ships, engaging in deliberate collisions with coast guard ships of other countries, flying drones over foreign warships and similar activities. Collusion of Pakistan with China in any conflict scenario with India would amount to prosecuting a two-front war and must therefore be worked into India’s force levels and plans. Pakistan will make intelligence available to China and facilitate logistics and sustenance of PLA Navy units. While this would allow India to label Pakistan as a belligerent in accordance with the laws of armed conflict and treat Pakistani assets as legitimate targets. He then highlighted the eleven point programme in times of conflict where India’s China strategy would necessarily include the maritime theatre as a ‘balancing’ mechanism as also to provide options for denial or offence as the developing situation warrants. First, India must build credible a deterrent force in quicker time including SSNs. India’s slow progress in this regard is a ‘strategic liability.’ Second, develop Andaman &Nicobar Islands for offensive capability. These islands must become the Hawaii of India with placement of potent assets from all three Service as well as Special Forces. Third, develop technological capability in areas such as seabed prospecting, oceanographic research and hydrocarbon prospecting so as to offer competitive service to IOR littorals. Fourth, develop better diplomatic relations with IOR littorals to deny operating space to China in any future conflict. Fifth, develop India’s own concept for grey zone warfare and to counter grey zone activities by China. Sixth, maintain robust surveillance of oceanic spaces. Seventh, aim to become an alternative source of supply to smaller countries for military hardware, maintenance and training. Eighth, redouble efforts to build capacity of smaller neighbours for surveillance of EEZ and in anti-poaching platforms/capability. Ninth, concentrate maritime offensive and defensive effort in IOR and not dissipate resources by trying to expand India’s reach further. In other words, maximise the geographical advantage that does not stretch supply lines. Tenth, utilise India’s strong relations with the USA, Japan and other nations to build capacity and shape international opinion in India’s favour. And finally, attempt to resolve remaining land border disputes with China. This would reduce the risk of confrontation in the maritime space as well. While concluding his remark Adm. Dasgupta mentioned that conflict with China is undesirable for India, as it would be for China. It is in the interest of both countries to resort to dialogue as the preferred mechanism for conflict-resolution. The unresolved land borders and the tensions that mount after border transgressions are the major flashpoints in the bilateral relations that could lead to conflict. China’s support to Pakistan in respect of illegally occupied and ceded Indian territories and its use of such territory to further its Belt and Road Initiative, while at the same time, expecting India to support its ‘One China’ policy, is an unfair expectation. India must not hesitate to revise its conventional stands on bilateral issues. Further, he drew attention to the geopolitical tension with regard to Taiwan which is the biggest flashpoint in the world that could lead to a major confrontation between USA-led forces and China. China is repeatedly staging aggressive and provocative military drills with an intent of using force to‘re-integrate’ Taiwan. The US forces are displaying an equally robust show of force. If this confrontation ever happens, it could change the futures of world powers in a manner that nobody can begin to imagine. What is certain is that should the Taiwan situation blow up into a war between China and US-led forces, both sides will take decades to recover from its aftermath. He therefore added that it is time for China to tone down its rhetoric in the South China Sea and display earnestness in resolving the land border with India. If China does not take steps to do this within a reasonable timeframe, its future intent of entering into conflict with India will be clear. In conclusion, he mentioned that while a conflict with China is undesirable for both nations, India’s preparedness must remain unwavering. Diplomacy should remain the primary mechanism for conflict resolution, but India must always be ready for any eventuality.

Lt. Gen. John Ranjan Mukherjee further delved deep into the Northeast, along with Eastern India, and discussed the significant challenges that India faces. Beginning with Assam he mentions that Assam has already started experiencing, and will continue to face, an increase in Islamic fundamentalism as religious fundamentalism has taken deep root there. The Muslim population in the Northeast, Bengal, Odisha, and Bihar — are collectively reaching as high as 35%. Alienating such a large portion of the population is counterproductive. Unfortunately, this alienation is pushing more groups toward insurgency, which must be addressed swiftly and decisively. If not, the region could face serious unrest — a situation that adversaries like China could exploit. The reactivation of ULFA (United Liberation Front of Assam) with support from ISI, Bangladeshi intelligence, and Chinese agencies is a major concern. Paresh Barua is reportedly in China, receiving support from Chinese authorities. The anti-talk faction of ULFA remains active, and its influence will likely expand as conditions in Bangladesh deteriorate. In South Assam, the influx of Rohingya migrants — particularly in Hailakandi, Karimganj, and surrounding areas with a significant Muslim population — is another emerging challenge. This situation could directly impact Tripura, which lies adjacent to these regions. Another major concern in Assam is the National Register of Citizens (NRC) and the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA). The Assamese population demands that non-indigenous residents be denied citizenship, while the Bengali population — both Hindu and Muslim migrants from Bangladesh — resists such exclusion. This conflict has already sparked unrest and will likely intensify. Moving to Manipur, he expressed strong disapproval of the central government’s handling of the situation. As someone belonging from a North-eastern regiment, he shared that diverse communities can coexist peacefully. Unfortunately, political manipulation has destabilized Manipur. The imposition of President’s Rule — which should have been implemented two years ago as recommended was delayed unnecessarily. The so-called “arms surrender” in Manipur has been ineffective. About 50% of the surrendered weapons are locally manufactured, not the sophisticated arms looted from police armouries. Out of the 6,500 weapons stolen, only about 1,000 have been recovered — half of which are locally made. The media’s portrayal of the Meitei groups surrendering arms is misleading; these groups are heavily implicated in the looting. The so-called “Opium War” in Manipur is essentially a territorial struggle for control over poppy cultivation regions. There has been no impartial action to address this conflict which was rightly pointed out by Amb. Mukhopadhay. The government’s actions have largely favoured the Meitei groups, alienating other ethnic communities like the Zo tribes and Nagas. This partiality will only fuel insurgency unless balanced measures are taken. The Chin National Army will likely continue supporting the Zo community on the Indian side of the border. Border fencing may worsen tensions rather than alleviate them. Similarly, the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and the Asian Highway linking Moreh and Tamu will struggle unless India actively engages with ethnic groups in these areas. Regarding Nagaland, the situation remains volatile. The Naga community is now divided into three groups: Eastern Nagaland, Western Nagaland, and the Manipur-based Naga faction (primarily the NSCN-IM). The NSCN-IM aims to consolidate Naga areas in Manipur into a unified Nagaland, heightening tensions. Without a proactive solution, insurgency could resurface in the region. In Tripura, Islamic fundamentalism could spread southward from Hailakandi and Karimganj. Moreover, tribal dissatisfaction with the current political leadership is mounting, which may reignite armed unrest. In Arunachal Pradesh, Chinese-backed groups are stirring unrest in the Lower Siang and Lohit regions. The NSCN factions, particularly NSCN-IM and NSCN-K, remain active in vying for control. Regarding Mizoram, the Zo community is increasingly resentful over being blamed for Manipur’s problems. Consequently, many Mizoram youth have joined the Zo insurgent groups in Manipur. Without a change in Delhi’s balanced approach, violence could spread to southern Mizoram and its border areas with Manipur. Thus, the overall, political landscape in the Northeast is precarious. Much of the unrest stems from political instigation. The CAA will have far-reaching implications for Mizoram (especially concerning the Bru and Chakma populations), Arunachal Pradesh (regarding the Chakmas and Tibetan refugees), and potentially Nepal, where a resurgence of Maoist insurgency at China’s behest is possible. Meghalaya remains relatively calm, but tensions persist between the Khasi and Garo tribes, particularly regarding immigration issues and perceived favouritism toward Bangladeshis. Pointing out several disadvantages Lt. Gen. Mukherjee shared that the region continues to lag behind in terms of infrastructure development, economic growth, and educational opportunities. Despite its strategic importance, the Northeast has not received the focused attention it requires. The Act East Policy was meant to integrate the region with Southeast Asia, but implementation has been slow and inconsistent. Road connectivity remains inadequate, particularly in remote areas, which hampers both economic activity and security operations. The Border Roads Organisation (BRO) is working to improve this, but progress is sluggish. Without better roads, trade routes cannot flourish, and military mobility remains constrained. Educational institutions in the region, while improving, still lack sufficient resources and quality faculty. This has resulted in a significant talent drain, with students migrating to other parts of India for higher education and better career prospects. On the economic front, despite abundant natural resources and fertile land, agricultural productivity is low. There’s immense potential for horticulture, organic farming, and bamboo-based industries, yet these sectors remain underdeveloped. Moreover, connectivity issues prevent local producers from accessing larger markets. Tourism, too, has yet to reach its full potential. The Northeast offers unparalleled natural beauty, diverse cultures, and rich heritage. However, inadequate infrastructure, limited promotional efforts, and occasional security concerns deter tourists. To bridge this gap, the government must adopt a multi-pronged approach — investing in infrastructure, promoting local industries, and ensuring fair political representation for all communities. A more inclusive development strategy is vital to bring the region on par with the rest of the country. Only through sustained investment, improved governance, and proactive diplomacy can we ensure the Northeast becomes a true bridge between India and Southeast Asia — fulfilling its strategic potential and securing long-term peace and prosperity. Finally, Eastern India’s economic neglect remains a root cause of dissatisfaction and unrest. Where economic disparity exists, political strife often follows. The growing instability in Bangladesh will inevitably affect the entire region. ISI operatives are already active in Bangladesh, providing support to insurgent groups. Intelligence agencies from Pakistan and China will undoubtedly exploit this unrest, further destabilizing the Northeast. Northern Myanmar is increasingly falling under Chinese influence. The PLA has reportedly secured agreements to deploy forces to protect their strategic interests there. Consequently, Northeast insurgent groups will likely gain refuge in Northern Myanmar, giving China a potential backdoor entry into the region. Though Lt. General’s assessment portrayed a grim picture and sounded bleak to the audience these concerns demands serious attention and concern as he shared them from his personal and professional experiences.

Further Maj. Gen. Roye added that the North-eastern region faces significant connectivity challenges due to the control of the Kachin and Karen valleys in Myanmar by the Zomi Rebels. This has effectively cut off India’s access to Southeast Asia, thereby hampering the Act East policy. India needs to address this situation to restore connectivity. The Golden Triangle’s narcotics trade is one of the major funding sources fuelling rebel activity, which continues to drive instability in Manipur. From the Army’s point of view, the priority is threefold: first, fostering ethnic harmony. Second, to take decisive action to curtail any foreign influence, whether it be Chinese, American, or any other and third to neutralize the insurgent elements. With regard to Myanmar, the junta is fully engaged in fighting the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) of the National Unity Government (NUG) and ethnic fighters such as the Arakan Army, the Kachin Independence Army, and the Karen National Army. However, as Ambassador Mukherjee pointed out, the junta is losing its grip on most of Myanmar. This clearly demonstrates Chinese backing for both sides, underscoring that regardless of who prevails in Myanmar, China will maintain an effective influence there. India’s various ground-level projects, such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, the Chin Development Initiative, the Thailand-Myanmar Trilateral Highway, and capacity-building assistance, have not yielded significant results. The real battle is for international legitimacy between the junta and the National Unity Government, with both vying for global recognition. Though on 8th February 2024, the Free Movement Regime (FMR) was ordered to be scrapped- it has not yet been completely removed, it has been significantly strengthened. Previously, movement was permitted up to 16 km across the border; this has now been reduced to 10 km. additionally, photo identity cards, QR codes, and other security measures have been introduced at various checkpoints. On 1st March 2024, the Hon’ble Home Minister announced plans to erect fencing along both sides of the border. However, building a border fence demands favourable geographical conditions, local support, and adequate funding — none of which are easily forthcoming. The governments of Nagaland and Mizoram have openly opposed border fencing. In his opinion based on his personal experience Maj Gen Roye points out that border fencing is a regressive step as troops stationed behind a border fence often end up guarding the fence itself rather than the actual border. Mentioning General Mukherjee, he shared that the local tribes are emotionally and sentimentally attached to their land. Even if India and Myanmar reach a mutual understanding, these tribes are unlikely to give in easily, especially since their leaders have controlled these lands and forests for generations. He reinforced the point, which was indirectly touched upon by Ambassador Mukherjee, regarding Delhi’s centralized control over Myanmar-related matters. It has been observed that local-level coordination between Indian and Myanmar authorities has yielded far better results than directives imposed from central governments. Local authorities understand each other’s perspectives, challenges, and operational requirements better. The Myanmar Army has approximately thirteen Light Divisions and about twelve Operational Command Divisions, totalling around one lakh fifty thousand troops. The navy is navy is small, and their air force is even smaller. Given their internal security commitments, there is a doubt whether Myanmar can dedicate much of this force to border security. While China may seek to exploit this situation, he believes that Myanmar is unlikely to allow China to use its territory for offensive actions against India. The prudent course of action for India is thus to enable the Myanmar Army to manage its internal challenges more effectively. This may include mutual cooperation at the local level, and possibly the provision of non-lethal equipment, communication systems, and training to enhance border management. He hoped to foresee that with proper local engagement, the Myanmar Army can be effectively supported — provided Delhi avoids micromanagement and allows local-level partnerships to flourish. As Ambassador Mukherjee highlighted, Maj. Gen. Roye focused on the region between the Chindwin River and the border — a grey zone where narcotics, arms smuggling, and even jihadi elements infiltrate India. In the last four years alone, approximately hundred eighty weapons (only 37% of total illegal arms) have been trafficked into India from Myanmar — excluding the vast narcotics trade. The India-Myanmar border is reportedly the second-largest narcotics trafficking route after the India-Nepal border. Contrary to Ambassador’s viewpoint, Maj. Gen Roye believes that China’s involvement with the junta remains uncertain. The recent visit by General Guang to Kunming (not Beijing) following the 2020 coup highlights China’s strategic caution. While China supports the junta, its parallel engagements with local insurgent groups remain a key aspect to watch. His personal view is that India too must explore outreach to certain rebel groups in Myanmar to safeguard her own interests. An analysis of recent Bangladesh history reveals a complex picture of victimization among local Bangladeshi populations, leading to ideological radicalization and political opportunism. The issue of terrorism in Bangladesh has deepened, particularly following Western counter-terrorism narratives post-9/11. The U.S.-led strategy promoted militarization of Bangladesh’s law enforcement agencies, which overlooked local sentiments and fuelled radicalization. While the Quota movement and the rise of groups like the MTI Bahini appeared prominent, these were often just cover stories for deeper ideological unrest. On the assumption that growing radicalization in Bangladesh could destabilize India’s Northeast, West Bengal, and Myanmar’s Rakhine State, the U.S. appears to be pursuing a strategy of controlled influence in Bangladesh and Myanmar to counter China’s regional dominance. Bangladesh’s growing alignment with Pakistan and Turkey poses a further challenge to India’s influence in the region. Reports indicate that Pakistan’s ISI is actively colluding with radical elements in Rangpur, close to the Siliguri Corridor. The ongoing conflict in Myanmar is already spilling over into India’s border states, exacerbating instability in the Northeast. As General Mukherjee mentioned, we are being encircled from multiple fronts, and timely action is imperative. While military intervention in Bangladesh may not be the ideal course, India must steer Dhaka back towards its secular roots while safeguarding our national security interests. Turning to Nepal, the recent developments suggest growing Chinese influence. Prime Minister Oli’s signing of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) agreement during his recent visit to China has opened a potential backdoor to India. Nepal’s seven-decade-long friendship with India is now at risk. The Lipulekh controversy, initiated by Mr. Oli and his parliament, has become a contentious issue that requires urgent diplomatic resolution. Nepal’s traditionally homogeneous society has seen growing divisions, particularly in the Terai region, dominated by the Madhesi community with strong ties to India. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s influence in Nepal is increasing, as evidenced by Nepal’s recent inclusion in the FATF grey list. Militarily, Nepal’s armed forces comprise about a lakh personnel, organized into nine divisions (one for each province, one for the Kathmandu Valley, and one in reserve). The reserve includes Special Forces, an Army Air Brigade, and key engineering and air defence units. Reports indicate that the Chinese PLA is involved in training some elements of the Nepalese Army, raising further security concerns. Finally, Bhutan remains a peaceful, non-violent Buddhist monarchy. While southern Bhutan is home to significant populations of Nepalese and Indian origin, northern Bhutan is sparsely populated by seasonal grazers from Tibet. Although Bhutan is not part of the BRI, China has constructed roads right up to Bhutan’s main border checkpoints. Bhutan’s vulnerability as a potential Chinese launchpad into the Siliguri Corridor remains a key concern. India’s longstanding defence pact with Bhutan, which allows troop deployment only upon invitation, requires review to ensure its continued effectiveness. Wrapping up his comments, Maj. Gen. Roye concluded that China’s overarching strategy aims to encircle India through influence over Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. While this strategy is far from complete, India must remain vigilant. To counterbalance this, India must focus on reinforcing the Siliguri Corridor’s security, enhancing border vigilance, and engaging in proactive diplomacy to maintain influence across the region.

PVSM, AVSM, VM ACM Arup Raha, spoke on air and space power aspects in terms of capabilities in context of India’s security challenges in the north eastern region and the strategy to contain them and mitigate the concerns. Both china and Pakistan have the capabilities, capacities and also the intensions to use military power – especially aerospace power against India in a short protracted war or a skirmish or even a long term war. he envisage that is no such threat from other neighbouring countries like- Myanmar, Nepal, Bhutan or even from Bangladesh given their present political scenario and despite the provocation that might come to them from time to time. However, diplomatic overtures, initiatives, incentives as well as strategic constraints against these neighbours will produce much more dividends than taking coercive actions against them during any kind of conflict with India. These countries would gain more socially and economically if they remain allied to India than with China as there are no civilizational or cultural linkages or similarities. But their air and maritime space maybe infringed by China if a full scale war with India. Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar have been traditionally armed by Bangladesh and now are poised to receive very powerful hi-tech weapon systems which are aimed at creating proxy war and keep the Indian armed forces busy in preparing contingency plans thereby diverting the attention from the main threat- China. Therefore India has to keep an eye on both the fronts- china and Pakistan and as well as in the north east region where the insurgency and terrorism pose a threat to the nation. Thus the aero- space power is necessary to deter the adversaries if a conflict is forced upon India then it would be able to terminate the same in advance to a favourable situation for India. He then went on to explain and analyse various factors to compare the Indian and Chinese aerospace powers. China’s national aspiration is to topple the US as the super power. India- considered being a regional power wants to keep Asia as a multipolar if not the entire world. In terms of economic strength both the nations started off in 1980s but within a four decades of time China has galloped away to become the largest economy power by even beating the USA. India lags far behind than China and won’t be able to catch up in the near future. Fortunately with the help of the private sector and entrepreneurs India is trying to launch off to become the third largest economy. An important aspect of any country’s defence capability is its defence budget. In comparison to India China’s defence budget is seven times larger. In terms of critical technology- China has made late strides in closing the gaps with the US. Not only is china spending money to develop its own infrastructure it also spending money in other countries for the same purpose. They have increased the military industrial complex (MIC) and spending money on various projects. As far as the military and civil aviation is concerned they are running large projects including fighter programmes, heavy bombers, radars, and submarines using advance technology. In comparison to these India is far behind in numbers if not in technologies. China has become a leader in artificial intelligence and cyber space activities and robotics. Indigenous engines are important component of any country’s vital defence asset. Further he explained the various aviation projects in great detail to the audience. He shared a concern that India does not have the provision for indigenous engines. As such India has to depend on USA for it who is the most unreliable defence partner. However India has still developed its technologies and composite aero structures. In terms airlift India has heavy lift capabilities and which could play an important role during any engagement with PLA and PLAF in this region. Intra valley troop transfer is an important aspect where India could enforce economy of effort and concentration of force. The HADR operations conducted by India are thus supported by this airlift facility. As far as the air defence systems are concerned India is powerful. In terms of integrated fighting capability – the Indian arm forces are doing quite well with a well-coordinated system. One disadvantage that India faces is that it has still not developed anti- drone system or tackling mass attacks by rockets and missiles or the direct energy system.  In terms of ballistic missiles defence (BMD) Indian scientists are doing well. In the space exploration India has been one of the leaders in the programmes. Command, control, communications, computers miss data handling as also intelligence surveillance targeting and navigations (C4ISTN) –all these can be upgraded through space based satellites- which is aimed by the present Indian government. Specific importance should be given to the availability and application of technologies in the warzones. An important constraint in regard to this aspect is that most of these hi-tech instruments may not be used in the mountainous regions of the Himalayas. First, the Chinse have focused on the infrastructure development by building roads, railways and last mile connectivity right up to the border but there are very few air force bases in the Tibet Autonomous Region- very frugal in terms of protecting their air assets. On the other hand India has more air field bases operating from the foothills with tremendous assets in terms of infrastructure. Secondly, leadership morale, training, exposure and experience are important factors. While concluding ACM Raha recommended a set of action plans for the nation. First, to expatiate fighter projects like LCA Mk2 and AMCA. Second, develop and manufacture indigenous jet engines. Third, enhance the numbers of the force multipliers i.e. to provide another tier of AD with DEW & IRON DOME equivalent system against massed drone/missile attack. Fourth, more satellite are to be launched in various orbital patterns so that C4ISR&TN capabilities of armed forces are looked after adequately. Fifth, operationalize the BMD& HGV systems quickly. Sixth, need to strengthen Andaman & Nicobar chain of islands with a large fleet of warships,  MR aircraft & land-based fighters in order to dominate the Indian Ocean region and the choke points of South East Asia. Seventh, deepen the MIC in length and breadth to ramp up production of weapons during a protracted war. Lastly, to draw up an integrated contingency plan to protect or/and nullify the threat on the Siliguri Corridor in the worst-case scenario of a collusive threat & violation of sovereignty of neighbours.

Major General PK Mallick, former SDS IN NDC, Cyber Warrior, Signals, gave his presentation on cyber and information war issues. He stated with discussing the information warfare has three components- electronic warfare, cyber warfare and psychological warfare. Delving deep into the cyber warfare he discussed the three components- computer network defence, computer network exploitation and computer network attack. Following this he went on to discuss the organisation for cyber defence. He briefly discussed exploitation as involving infiltrating someone else’s network to gather information, often without any visible interference. This is akin to espionage. However, if one intends to launch a cyber-attack, exploitation is a prerequisite. Once inside an adversary’s system, subtle changes can be introduced to enable destructive actions — this is when a cyber network attack begins. He stressed on the fact that China is a champion in the field of cyber espionage. However China till date could not display their capability of offensive operations as the Russian have already shown. He then went on to discuss the Cyber Typhoons. The first one is the Volt typhoon where the Chinese cyber threat actors have gained access to important US networks. The second one is the Salt typhoon where the Chinese penetrated multiple telecommunications networks to spy on the Americans. Interestingly, Salt Typhoon and Volt Typhoon differ in terms of their operational objectives and their temporal dimensions. Objectives of Salt Typhoon are to steal information in support of intelligence collection priorities. Volt Typhoon represents cyber operational preparation of the environment the immediate operational objective is to gain access and preposition capabilities to use at some future date. It gives China tools it can use later. Unfortunately in India cyber details are not revealed as in japan or Taiwan. Major General Mallick next went on to discuss the psychological warfare. He then discussed about the four types of power. First, the soft power- where there is ability to attract and co- opt through culture values and policies. Second is the smart power which is a strategic blend of soft power and hard tools. Third is the sharp power characterized by manipulation tactics like disinformation and cyber intrusions to undermine democratic systems. Fourth is the discourse power that focusses on shaping global narratives and norms to project their worldview and influence international system. China however talks about thee warfare which are public opinion warfare, psychological warfare and the legal warfare. He then discussed in great details about who coordinates and executes the psychological operations and the main actors implementing the Chinese psychological operations which in turn includes the party, the state the PLA and the private and public companies. Chinese psychological operations are coordinated at the highest levels, involving the Communist Party, state organs, the PLA, and even public and private companies. This structure is comparable to the CIA, FBI, RAW, and IB in some respects. China is particularly aggressive in transnational repression, targeting Uyghurs, Tibetans, Chinese Christians, and Falun Gong practitioners through extensive digital surveillance. China executes brutal and pervasive transnational repression. China employs a strategy called “Borrowing a Boat to Sail Out to Sea”, wherein Chinese officials use Western social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube (which are blocked in China) to propagate their narratives globally. Platforms such as TikTok and Tencent play a significant role in these efforts. In addition, Chinese state-controlled media, embassies, and networks of civilian volunteers are heavily involved. Recently, China has also come up with international communication centres with the responsibility of propaganda, coordinating resources monitoring international public opinion and building networks. China’s Confucius Institutes, once widespread in the United States faced significant backlash, leading to closures. However, China has now shifted to establishing International Communication Centres, targeting strategic regions for influence. In contrast, Indian psychological operations largely focus on perception management in regions like the Northeast, Jammu & Kashmir, and the borders. While agencies like the Intelligence Bureau, RAW, CAPF, and the military conduct effective perception management, conventional warfare scenarios require more targeted psychological strategies. In India, there’s ambiguity regarding the authority responsible for psychological operations. While the MEA, intelligence agencies, MOD, and other ministries play roles, a coordinated strategy is lacking. Effective psychological operations require a dedicated lead agency to craft narratives, select targets, deliver messages, measure outcomes, and refine the strategy. Though Major General mentioned about the economic coercion and cognitive domain operations – he did not go into the details of explaining them as they are separate subjects in themselves. In conclusion Major General Mallick mentioned on Sun Tzu that no matter what we say about technology but it has to be understood that a war cannot be won if the bullet is not fired. While there is no doubt that technology and information warfare are crucial, manpower remains indispensable. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine serves as a reminder that no war has ever been won without hard battles on the ground.

The presentations by the panellists were followed by an interactive session where the present audience shared their views. They are discussed as follows:

The first question was on Bangladesh and ISI Activities where the audience wanted to know what kind of linkages they are trying to establish. Are they attempting to revive their old camps, seeking funding, or now looking to enter through lower Assam and re-energize their network, which is now predominantly in Muslim-populated areas? Or are they progressing further towards Central Assam through these routes? Answering to that question Gen. Roye gave his personal impressions based on information from old contacts who remain reliable sources. The ISI never truly left Bangladesh. Even after Bangladesh gained independence, they remained dormant. Now, the ISI has revived its activities, working in conjunction with Bangladeshi intelligence. From what we see publicly, their first move has been towards the Bulge leading to the Siliguri Corridor. Their primary objective seems to be establishing bases to spread fundamentalism into the corridor. It’s well-known that religious fundamentalism is concentrated in regions like Bengal, Bihar, and the Siliguri Corridor. The second area where they are very active is the Chittagong Hill Tracts along the Myanmar border. These are the two main regions where ISI-backed activities have intensified, with their influence rapidly spreading into interior areas to mobilize support from Jamaat-affiliated groups. Further Gen. Mukherjee added that, to reinforce, the GMB, in collusion with the ISI, is firmly entrenched in Rangpur — the Bulge he mentioned. Their primary objective seems twofold: if the Siliguri Corridor can be intercepted, the entire Northeast would be destabilized, aligning with their original plans for the eastern flank.

The second question posed, by Amb. Mukhopadhaya was regarding the vulnerability of the Siliguri Corridor and the deterioration of our relationship with Bangladesh, the key question arises: what measures can we take to mitigate these risks — whether politically or militarily? Answering to this Maj.Gen, Roye mentioned that addressing this issue requires action on multiple fronts — social, diplomatic, geographic, and military. Military intervention should be the last resort, as acting prematurely may yield adverse results while he deliberately omitted mentioning politicians, whose role is crucial in shaping diplomatic efforts to safeguard national security. However, if the situation demands it, establishing strategic depth will be essential.

In the concluding remarks ACM Raha, gave a synthesis of the deliberations of the hybrid seminar. The Seminar on India’s security challenges in the Eastern and North-eastern regions had been insightful and relevant. The strategy to mitigate these concerns had been thoughtfully discussed by the experts on the same. The seminar covered five sessions over four hours, featuring ten eminent speakers with significant domain knowledge on China, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, Bhutan, and the North-eastern region. Topics such as internal dynamics, air and naval security, information warfare, and cyber threats were comprehensively addressed. The speakers provided valuable insights into regional dynamics, their fallout, and implications for India. They also outlined strategies to address these challenges. The first point that he made was that India’s strategic position remains in an oasis of stability in a volatile geopolitical, geo-economic, and geo-strategic environment. Political upheavals, economic crises, and prolonged conflicts like those in Ukraine and Palestine have shifted the focus from swift wars to protracted conflicts. Secondly, he emphasised upon building comprehensive national power to be prepared for prolonged conflicts and counter collusive threats while enhancing economic power is crucial. Economic growth will support indigenization of warfighting equipment and expand the military-industrial complex, providing strategic depth if needed. Thirdly he thinks that in this geopolitical uncertainty with global disruptions in trade, commerce, and politics, navigating this volatile environment would be a challenge for India. Fourthly, he pointed out that insurgency, ethnic conflicts, drug trafficking, and arms smuggling i.e. the internal security in the Northeast must be addressed through effective governance, policing, and border management along with timely negotiations with rebel groups. Fifthly, enhanced improved intelligence is essential to pre-empt ISI-backed subversive activities, as well as threats from Chinese and Bangladeshi agents. Sixthly and one of the most important aspects is securing the Siliguri Corridor. Given its vulnerability, the military must prepare contingency plans to counter threats if China colludes with neighbouring states to disrupt this vital region. A joint, integrated strategy is thus essential. Finally he pointed out that while maintaining military readiness in this hostile environment is crucial, peace must remain the priority. This is a time for diplomacy and negotiation, ensuring that conflict resolution efforts are prioritized to safeguard India’s national interests. Lastly, he thanked all the eminent speakers for their contributions, as well as to the Army Commander, Eastern Command, and the staff at Headquarters and CENERS-K for their tremendous support in organizing this seminar. Special acknowledgment was given to Gen. Mukherjee, the anchor of this seminar, as well as General Roy and Brigadier Mukherjee for their contributions.